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All the ideas for 'Analyticity Reconsidered', 'Inexpressible Properties and Propositions' and 'Logical Consequence'

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25 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 4. Real Definition
9376 A sentence may simultaneously define a term, and also assert a fact [Boghossian]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 3. Minimalist Truth
17990 Instances of minimal truth miss out propositions inexpressible in current English [Hofweber]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 2. Syllogistic Logic
10688 'Equivocation' is when terms do not mean the same thing in premises and conclusion [Beall/Restall]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 4. Pure Logic
10690 Formal logic is invariant under permutations, or devoid of content, or gives the norms for thought [Beall/Restall]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 2. Types of Consequence
10691 Logical consequence needs either proofs, or absence of counterexamples [Beall/Restall]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 4. Semantic Consequence |=
10695 Logical consequence is either necessary truth preservation, or preservation based on interpretation [Beall/Restall]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 8. Material Implication
10689 A step is a 'material consequence' if we need contents as well as form [Beall/Restall]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 4. Substitutional Quantification
17988 Quantification can't all be substitutional; some reference is obviously to objects [Hofweber]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 2. Formal Truth
9375 Conventionalism agrees with realists that logic has truth values, but not over the source [Boghossian]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 3. Logical Truth
10696 A 'logical truth' (or 'tautology', or 'theorem') follows from empty premises [Beall/Restall]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
10693 Models are mathematical structures which interpret the non-logical primitives [Beall/Restall]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 2. Proof in Mathematics
10692 Hilbert proofs have simple rules and complex axioms, and natural deduction is the opposite [Beall/Restall]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
17989 Since properties have properties, there can be a typed or a type-free theory of them [Hofweber]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 4. A Priori as Necessities
9369 'Snow is white or it isn't' is just true, not made true by stipulation [Boghossian]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 8. A Priori as Analytic
9367 The a priori is explained as analytic to avoid a dubious faculty of intuition [Boghossian]
9373 That logic is a priori because it is analytic resulted from explaining the meaning of logical constants [Boghossian]
9380 We can't hold a sentence true without evidence if we can't agree which sentence is definitive of it [Boghossian]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 11. Denying the A Priori
9384 We may have strong a priori beliefs which we pragmatically drop from our best theory [Boghossian]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
9374 If we learn geometry by intuition, how could this faculty have misled us for so long? [Boghossian]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / c. Meaning by Role
9377 'Conceptual role semantics' says terms have meaning from sentences and/or inferences [Boghossian]
9378 If meaning depends on conceptual role, what properties are needed to do the job? [Boghossian]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 8. Synonymy
9372 Could expressions have meaning, without two expressions possibly meaning the same? [Boghossian]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 2. Analytic Truths
17721 There are no truths in virtue of meaning, but there is knowability in virtue of understanding [Boghossian, by Jenkins]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 3. Analytic and Synthetic
9368 Epistemological analyticity: grasp of meaning is justification; metaphysical: truth depends on meaning [Boghossian]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / a. Translation
17991 Holism says language can't be translated; the expressibility hypothesis says everything can [Hofweber]