58 ideas
| 9331 | How do we determine which of the sentences containing a term comprise its definition? [Horwich] |
| 14684 | A world is 'accessible' to another iff the first is possible according to the second [Salmon,N] |
| 14669 | For metaphysics, T may be the only correct system of modal logic [Salmon,N] |
| 14667 | System B has not been justified as fallacy-free for reasoning on what might have been [Salmon,N] |
| 14668 | In B it seems logically possible to have both p true and p is necessarily possibly false [Salmon,N] |
| 14692 | System B implies that possibly-being-realized is an essential property of the world [Salmon,N] |
| 14671 | What is necessary is not always necessarily necessary, so S4 is fallacious [Salmon,N] |
| 14686 | S5 modal logic ignores accessibility altogether [Salmon,N] |
| 14691 | S5 believers say that-things-might-have-been-that-way is essential to ways things might have been [Salmon,N] |
| 14693 | The unsatisfactory counterpart-theory allows the retention of S5 [Salmon,N] |
| 14670 | Metaphysical (alethic) modal logic concerns simple necessity and possibility (not physical, epistemic..) [Salmon,N] |
| 14678 | Any property is attached to anything in some possible world, so I am a radical anti-essentialist [Salmon,N] |
| 14680 | Logical possibility contains metaphysical possibility, which contains nomological possibility [Salmon,N] |
| 14690 | In the S5 account, nested modalities may be unseen, but they are still there [Salmon,N] |
| 14677 | Metaphysical necessity is said to be unrestricted necessity, true in every world whatsoever [Salmon,N] |
| 14679 | Bizarre identities are logically but not metaphysically possible, so metaphysical modality is restricted [Salmon,N] |
| 14688 | Without impossible worlds, the unrestricted modality that is metaphysical has S5 logic [Salmon,N] |
| 14685 | Metaphysical necessity is NOT truth in all (unrestricted) worlds; necessity comes first, and is restricted [Salmon,N] |
| 14681 | Logical necessity is free of constraints, and may accommodate all of S5 logic [Salmon,N] |
| 14676 | Nomological necessity is expressed with intransitive relations in modal semantics [Salmon,N] |
| 14689 | Necessity and possibility are not just necessity and possibility according to the actual world [Salmon,N] |
| 14674 | Impossible worlds are also ways for things to be [Salmon,N] |
| 14682 | Denial of impossible worlds involves two different confusions [Salmon,N] |
| 14687 | Without impossible worlds, how things might have been is the only way for things to be [Salmon,N] |
| 14683 | Possible worlds rely on what might have been, so they can' be used to define or analyse modality [Salmon,N] |
| 14672 | Possible worlds are maximal abstract ways that things might have been [Salmon,N] |
| 14675 | Possible worlds just have to be 'maximal', but they don't have to be consistent [Salmon,N] |
| 14673 | You can't define worlds as sets of propositions, and then define propositions using worlds [Salmon,N] |
| 9333 | A priori belief is not necessarily a priori justification, or a priori knowledge [Horwich] |
| 9342 | Understanding needs a priori commitment [Horwich] |
| 9332 | Meaning is generated by a priori commitment to truth, not the other way around [Horwich] |
| 9341 | Meanings and concepts cannot give a priori knowledge, because they may be unacceptable [Horwich] |
| 9334 | If we stipulate the meaning of 'number' to make Hume's Principle true, we first need Hume's Principle [Horwich] |
| 9339 | A priori knowledge (e.g. classical logic) may derive from the innate structure of our minds [Horwich] |
| 20547 | We should respect the right of people to live in their own way, even if it is irrational [Swift] |
| 20564 | Anti-colonial movements usually invoke the right of their 'people' to self-determination [Swift] |
| 20535 | Isn't it more rational to maximise the average position, but with a safety net? [Swift] |
| 20537 | Hypothetical contracts have no binding force [Swift] |
| 20542 | Cosmopolitans reject the right of different states to distribute resources in different ways [Swift] |
| 20559 | Democracy is bad, but the other systems are worse [Swift] |
| 20561 | Since all opinions are treated as equal in democracy, it implies there are no right answers [Swift] |
| 20562 | Design your democracy to treat citizens equally, or to produce better citizens? [Swift] |
| 20563 | Design your democracy to yield political stability, or good decisions? [Swift] |
| 20560 | Teledemocracy omits debate and deliberation, which are important parts of good decisions [Swift] |
| 20554 | Multiculturalism is a barrier to the whole state being a community [Swift] |
| 20553 | Liberals mistakenly think individuals choose their values, without reference to the community [Swift] |
| 20556 | The best way to build a cohesive community is to be involved in a war [Swift] |
| 20557 | Membership and inclusion in a community implies non-membership and exclusion [Swift] |
| 20555 | Liberals are concerned to protect individuals from too much community [Swift] |
| 20540 | Redistributing wealth treats some people as means, rather than as ends [Swift] |
| 20551 | Men have had the power to structure all of our social institutions [Swift] |
| 20545 | Maybe a freedom is from a restraint, and also in order to do something [Swift] |
| 20550 | Opportunity should ignore extraneous factors, or foster competence, or ignore all disadvantages [Swift] |
| 20536 | Inequalities are needed, as incentives to do the most important jobs [Swift] |
| 20548 | A person can desire redistibution of wealth, without it being for reasons of equality [Swift] |
| 20541 | You can't necessarily sell your legitimate right to something, even if you produced it [Swift] |
| 20546 | Libertarians about property ignore the fact that private property is a denial of freedoms [Swift] |
| 20533 | Justice can be seen as fairness or entitlement or desert [Swift] |