39 ideas
| 9331 | How do we determine which of the sentences containing a term comprise its definition? [Horwich] |
| 11984 | Asserting a possible property is to say it would have had the property if that world had been actual [Plantinga] |
| 11980 | A possible world is a maximal possible state of affairs [Plantinga] |
| 11982 | If possible Socrates differs from actual Socrates, the Indiscernibility of Identicals says they are different [Plantinga] |
| 11983 | It doesn't matter that we can't identify the possible Socrates; we can't identify adults from baby photos [Plantinga] |
| 11985 | If individuals can only exist in one world, then they can never lack any of their properties [Plantinga] |
| 11986 | The counterparts of Socrates have self-identity, but only the actual Socrates has identity-with-Socrates [Plantinga] |
| 11987 | Counterpart Theory absurdly says I would be someone else if things went differently [Plantinga] |
| 9333 | A priori belief is not necessarily a priori justification, or a priori knowledge [Horwich] |
| 9342 | Understanding needs a priori commitment [Horwich] |
| 9332 | Meaning is generated by a priori commitment to truth, not the other way around [Horwich] |
| 9341 | Meanings and concepts cannot give a priori knowledge, because they may be unacceptable [Horwich] |
| 9334 | If we stipulate the meaning of 'number' to make Hume's Principle true, we first need Hume's Principle [Horwich] |
| 9339 | A priori knowledge (e.g. classical logic) may derive from the innate structure of our minds [Horwich] |
| 23590 | Criminal responsibility can be fully assigned to each member of a group [Walzer] |
| 23578 | Double Effect needs a double intention - to achieve the good, and minimise the evil [Walzer] |
| 23564 | Deep ethical theory is very controversial, but we have to live with higher ethical practice [Walzer] |
| 23568 | If whole states possess rights, there can be social relations between states [Walzer] |
| 23571 | States can rightly pre-empt real and serious threats [Walzer] |
| 23572 | Just wars are self-defence, or a rightful intercession in another's troubles [Walzer] |
| 23581 | The aim of reprisals is to enforce the rules of war [Walzer] |
| 23582 | Reprisal is defensible, as an alternative to war [Walzer] |
| 23588 | With nuclear weapons we have a permanent supreme emergency (which is unstable) [Walzer] |
| 23580 | States need not endure attacks passively, and successful reprisals are legitimate [Walzer] |
| 23587 | Nuclear bombs are not for normal war; they undermine the 'just war', with a new morality [Walzer] |
| 23567 | Even non-violent intrusive acts between states count as aggression, if they justify resistance [Walzer] |
| 23570 | The only good reason for fighting is in defence of rights [Walzer] |
| 23573 | For moral reasons, a just war must be a limited war [Walzer] |
| 23577 | Napoleon said 'I don't care about the deaths of a million men' [Walzer] |
| 23593 | Jus ad bellum and Jus in bello are independent; unjust wars can be fought in a just way [Walzer] |
| 23574 | The duties and moral status of loyal and obedient soldiers is the same in defence and aggression [Walzer] |
| 23575 | We can't blame soldiers for anything they do which clearly promotes victory [Walzer] |
| 23584 | Rejecting Combatant Equality allows just soldiers to be harsher, even to the extreme [Walzer] |
| 23589 | Kidnapped sailors and volunteers have different obligations to the passengers [Walzer] |
| 23614 | Even aggressor soldiers are not criminals, so they have equal rights with their opponents [Walzer] |
| 23579 | Soldiers will only protect civilians if they feel safe from them [Walzer] |
| 23586 | What matters in war is unacceptable targets, not unacceptable weapons [Walzer] |
| 23591 | If the oppressor is cruel, nonviolence is either surrender, or a mere gesture [Walzer] |
| 23592 | We can only lead war towards peace if we firmly enforce the rules of war [Walzer] |