Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Bayesianism', 'Scientific Attitude and Fallibilism' and 'Grounding Concepts'

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27 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
Examining concepts can recover information obtained through the senses [Jenkins]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 2. Correspondence to Facts
Instead of correspondence of proposition to fact, look at correspondence of its parts [Jenkins]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure
Numbers are just names devised for counting [Peirce]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / a. The Infinite
Combining the concepts of negation and finiteness gives the concept of infinity [Jenkins]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / a. Mathematical empiricism
Arithmetic concepts are indispensable because they accurately map the world [Jenkins]
Senses produce concepts that map the world, and arithmetic is known through these concepts [Jenkins]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / c. Against mathematical empiricism
That two two-eyed people must have four eyes is a statement about numbers, not a fact [Peirce]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
It is not easy to show that Hume's Principle is analytic or definitive in the required sense [Jenkins]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / c. Grounding and explanation
We can learn about the world by studying the grounding of our concepts [Jenkins]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 4. Ontological Dependence
There's essential, modal, explanatory, conceptual, metaphysical and constitutive dependence [Jenkins, by PG]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 4. Category Realism
The concepts we have to use for categorising are ones which map the real world well [Jenkins]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 3. Fallibilism
Reasoning is based on statistical induction, so it can't achieve certainty or precision [Peirce]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 3. Innate Knowledge / a. Innate knowledge
Innate truths are very uncertain and full of error, so they certainly have exceptions [Peirce]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 9. A Priori from Concepts
Examining accurate, justified or grounded concepts brings understanding of the world [Jenkins]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
It is not enough that intuition be reliable - we need to know why it is reliable [Jenkins]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 3. Inspiration
A truth is hard for us to understand if it rests on nothing but inspiration [Peirce]
If we decide an idea is inspired, we still can't be sure we have got the idea right [Peirce]
Only reason can establish whether some deliverance of revelation really is inspired [Peirce]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
Knowledge is true belief which can be explained just by citing the proposition believed [Jenkins]
14. Science / C. Induction / 6. Bayes's Theorem
Bayes' theorem explains why very surprising predictions have a higher value as evidence [Horwich]
Probability of H, given evidence E, is prob(H) x prob(E given H) / prob(E) [Horwich]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 2. Imagination
Only imagination can connect phenomena together in a rational way [Peirce]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / b. Empirical concepts
The physical effect of world on brain explains the concepts we possess [Jenkins]
Grounded concepts are trustworthy maps of the world [Jenkins]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
Verificationism is better if it says meaningfulness needs concepts grounded in the senses [Jenkins]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
Success semantics explains representation in terms of success in action [Jenkins]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 1. Analytic Propositions
'Analytic' can be conceptual, or by meaning, or predicate inclusion, or definition... [Jenkins]