Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Bayesianism', 'Scientific Attitude and Fallibilism' and 'Tarski's Theory of Truth'

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19 ideas

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 4. Uses of Truth
10825 The notion of truth is to help us make use of the utterances of others [Field,H]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 9. Rejecting Truth
10820 In the early 1930s many philosophers thought truth was not scientific [Field,H]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / a. Tarski's truth definition
13499 Tarski reduced truth to reference or denotation [Field,H, by Hart,WD]
10818 Tarski really explained truth in terms of denoting, predicating and satisfied functions [Field,H]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / b. Satisfaction and truth
10817 Tarski just reduced truth to some other undefined semantic notions [Field,H]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 2. Formal Truth
10819 Tarski gives us the account of truth needed to build a group of true sentences in a model [Field,H]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
10827 Model theory is unusual in restricting the range of the quantifiers [Field,H]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure
14775 Numbers are just names devised for counting [Peirce]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / c. Against mathematical empiricism
14776 That two two-eyed people must have four eyes is a statement about numbers, not a fact [Peirce]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 3. Fallibilism
14770 Reasoning is based on statistical induction, so it can't achieve certainty or precision [Peirce]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 3. Innate Knowledge / a. Innate knowledge
14774 Innate truths are very uncertain and full of error, so they certainly have exceptions [Peirce]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 3. Inspiration
14773 A truth is hard for us to understand if it rests on nothing but inspiration [Peirce]
14772 If we decide an idea is inspired, we still can't be sure we have got the idea right [Peirce]
14771 Only reason can establish whether some deliverance of revelation really is inspired [Peirce]
14. Science / C. Induction / 6. Bayes's Theorem
2798 Probability of H, given evidence E, is prob(H) x prob(E given H) / prob(E) [Horwich]
2799 Bayes' theorem explains why very surprising predictions have a higher value as evidence [Horwich]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 2. Imagination
14769 Only imagination can connect phenomena together in a rational way [Peirce]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
10826 'Valence' and 'gene' had to be reduced to show their compatibility with physicalism [Field,H]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
7615 Field says reference is a causal physical relation between mental states and objects [Field,H, by Putnam]