Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Stipulation, Meaning and Apriority', 'Lewis: reduction of mind (on himself)' and 'Jerry A. Fodor on himself'

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26 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 13. Against Definition
9331 How do we determine which of the sentences containing a term comprise its definition? [Horwich]
2. Reason / E. Argument / 1. Argument
3993 Arguments are nearly always open to challenge, but they help to explain a position rather than force people to believe [Lewis]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
3990 The whole truth supervenes on the physical truth [Lewis]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / b. Types of supervenience
3991 Where pixels make up a picture, supervenience is reduction [Lewis]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 1. Nature of the A Priori
9333 A priori belief is not necessarily a priori justification, or a priori knowledge [Horwich]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 6. A Priori from Reason
9342 Understanding needs a priori commitment [Horwich]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 8. A Priori as Analytic
9332 Meaning is generated by a priori commitment to truth, not the other way around [Horwich]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 9. A Priori from Concepts
9341 Meanings and concepts cannot give a priori knowledge, because they may be unacceptable [Horwich]
9334 If we stipulate the meaning of 'number' to make Hume's Principle true, we first need Hume's Principle [Horwich]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 10. A Priori as Subjective
9339 A priori knowledge (e.g. classical logic) may derive from the innate structure of our minds [Horwich]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 2. Associationism
3978 Associations are held to connect Ideas together in the way the world is connected together [Fodor]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / b. Purpose of mind
3995 A mind is an organ of representation [Lewis]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
3976 Intentional science needs objects with semantic and causal properties, and which obey laws [Fodor]
3980 Intentional states and processes may be causal relations among mental symbols [Fodor]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
3994 Human pain might be one thing; Martian pain might be something else [Lewis]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
3989 I am a reductionist about mind because I am an a priori reductionist about everything [Lewis]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
3981 Most psychological properties seem to be multiply realisable [Fodor]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 4. Folk Psychology
3992 Folk psychology makes good predictions, by associating mental states with causal roles [Lewis]
3975 Folk psychology explains behaviour by reference to intentional states like belief and desire [Fodor]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 4. Language of Thought
3996 Folk psychology doesn't say that there is a language of thought [Lewis]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
3982 How could the extrinsic properties of thoughts supervene on their intrinsic properties? [Fodor]
3998 If you don't share an external world with a brain-in-a-vat, then externalism says you don't share any beliefs [Lewis]
3997 Nothing shows that all content is 'wide', or that wide content has logical priority [Lewis]
3999 A spontaneous duplicate of you would have your brain states but no experience, so externalism would deny him any beliefs [Lewis]
4000 Wide content derives from narrow content and relationships with external things [Lewis]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 9. Counterfactual Claims
3977 Laws are true generalisations which support counterfactuals and are confirmed by instances [Fodor]