16 ideas
15527 | Defining terms either enables elimination, or shows that they don't require elimination [Lewis] |
9331 | How do we determine which of the sentences containing a term comprise its definition? [Horwich] |
15530 | A logically determinate name names the same thing in every possible world [Lewis] |
9333 | A priori belief is not necessarily a priori justification, or a priori knowledge [Horwich] |
9342 | Understanding needs a priori commitment [Horwich] |
9332 | Meaning is generated by a priori commitment to truth, not the other way around [Horwich] |
9341 | Meanings and concepts cannot give a priori knowledge, because they may be unacceptable [Horwich] |
9334 | If we stipulate the meaning of 'number' to make Hume's Principle true, we first need Hume's Principle [Horwich] |
9339 | A priori knowledge (e.g. classical logic) may derive from the innate structure of our minds [Horwich] |
15528 | A Ramsey sentence just asserts that a theory can be realised, without saying by what [Lewis] |
15526 | There is a method for defining new scientific terms just using the terms we already understand [Lewis] |
15529 | It is better to have one realisation of a theory than many - but it may not always be possible [Lewis] |
15531 | The Ramsey sentence of a theory says that it has at least one realisation [Lewis] |
21731 | Fields can be 'scalar', or 'vector', or 'tensor', or 'spinor' [Baggott] |
21730 | A 'field' is a property with a magnitude, distributed across all of space and time [Baggott] |
21732 | The current standard model requires 61 particles [Baggott] |