14 ideas
9331 | How do we determine which of the sentences containing a term comprise its definition? [Horwich] |
14212 | A consistent theory just needs one model; isomorphic versions will do too, and large domains provide those [Lewis] |
14213 | Anti-realists see the world as imaginary, or lacking joints, or beyond reference, or beyond truth [Lewis] |
14082 | No sortal could ever exactly pin down which set of particles count as this 'cup' [Schaffer,J] |
14210 | A gerrymandered mereological sum can be a mess, but still have natural joints [Lewis] |
14081 | Identities can be true despite indeterminate reference, if true under all interpretations [Schaffer,J] |
9333 | A priori belief is not necessarily a priori justification, or a priori knowledge [Horwich] |
9342 | Understanding needs a priori commitment [Horwich] |
9332 | Meaning is generated by a priori commitment to truth, not the other way around [Horwich] |
9341 | Meanings and concepts cannot give a priori knowledge, because they may be unacceptable [Horwich] |
9334 | If we stipulate the meaning of 'number' to make Hume's Principle true, we first need Hume's Principle [Horwich] |
9339 | A priori knowledge (e.g. classical logic) may derive from the innate structure of our minds [Horwich] |
14215 | Causal theories of reference make errors in reference easy [Lewis] |
14209 | Descriptive theories remain part of the theory of reference (with seven mild modifications) [Lewis] |