17 ideas
15545 | Armstrong's analysis seeks truthmakers rather than definitions [Lewis] |
9331 | How do we determine which of the sentences containing a term comprise its definition? [Horwich] |
15395 | Give up objects necessitating truths, and say their natures cause the truths? [Cameron] |
15546 | Predications aren't true because of what exists, but of how it exists [Lewis] |
15394 | Truthmaker requires a commitment to tropes or states of affairs, for contingent truths [Cameron] |
15548 | Say 'truth is supervenient on being', but construe 'being' broadly [Lewis] |
14399 | Presentism says only the present exists, so there is nothing for tensed truths to supervene on [Lewis] |
15543 | How do things combine to make states of affairs? Constituents can repeat, and fail to combine [Lewis] |
15401 | Essentialists say intrinsic properties arise from what the thing is, irrespective of surroundings [Cameron] |
15393 | An object's intrinsic properties are had in virtue of how it is, independently [Cameron] |
15396 | Most criteria for identity over time seem to leave two later objects identical to the earlier one [Cameron] |
9333 | A priori belief is not necessarily a priori justification, or a priori knowledge [Horwich] |
9342 | Understanding needs a priori commitment [Horwich] |
9332 | Meaning is generated by a priori commitment to truth, not the other way around [Horwich] |
9341 | Meanings and concepts cannot give a priori knowledge, because they may be unacceptable [Horwich] |
9334 | If we stipulate the meaning of 'number' to make Hume's Principle true, we first need Hume's Principle [Horwich] |
9339 | A priori knowledge (e.g. classical logic) may derive from the innate structure of our minds [Horwich] |