Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Stipulation, Meaning and Apriority', 'How to Define Theoretical Terms' and 'Structuralism and the Notion of Dependence'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

22 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 2. Aims of Definition
15527 Defining terms either enables elimination, or shows that they don't require elimination [Lewis]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 13. Against Definition
9331 How do we determine which of the sentences containing a term comprise its definition? [Horwich]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / b. Varieties of structuralism
14085 'Deductivist' structuralism is just theories, with no commitment to objects, or modality [Linnebo]
14084 Non-eliminative structuralism treats mathematical objects as positions in real abstract structures [Linnebo]
14086 'Modal' structuralism studies all possible concrete models for various mathematical theories [Linnebo]
14087 'Set-theoretic' structuralism treats mathematics as various structures realised among the sets [Linnebo]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / d. Platonist structuralism
14089 Structuralism differs from traditional Platonism, because the objects depend ontologically on their structure [Linnebo]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / e. Structuralism critique
14083 Structuralism is right about algebra, but wrong about sets [Linnebo]
14090 In mathematical structuralism the small depends on the large, which is the opposite of physical structures [Linnebo]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 4. Ontological Dependence
14091 There may be a one-way direction of dependence among sets, and among natural numbers [Linnebo]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 4. Intrinsic Properties
14088 An 'intrinsic' property is either found in every duplicate, or exists independent of all externals [Linnebo]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
15530 A logically determinate name names the same thing in every possible world [Lewis]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 1. Nature of the A Priori
9333 A priori belief is not necessarily a priori justification, or a priori knowledge [Horwich]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 6. A Priori from Reason
9342 Understanding needs a priori commitment [Horwich]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 8. A Priori as Analytic
9332 Meaning is generated by a priori commitment to truth, not the other way around [Horwich]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 9. A Priori from Concepts
9341 Meanings and concepts cannot give a priori knowledge, because they may be unacceptable [Horwich]
9334 If we stipulate the meaning of 'number' to make Hume's Principle true, we first need Hume's Principle [Horwich]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 10. A Priori as Subjective
9339 A priori knowledge (e.g. classical logic) may derive from the innate structure of our minds [Horwich]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 8. Ramsey Sentences
15528 A Ramsey sentence just asserts that a theory can be realised, without saying by what [Lewis]
15526 There is a method for defining new scientific terms just using the terms we already understand [Lewis]
15529 It is better to have one realisation of a theory than many - but it may not always be possible [Lewis]
15531 The Ramsey sentence of a theory says that it has at least one realisation [Lewis]