14 ideas
9331 | How do we determine which of the sentences containing a term comprise its definition? [Horwich] |
13857 | Truth-functional possibilities include the irrelevant, which is a mistake [Edgington] |
13853 | It is a mistake to think that conditionals are statements about how the world is [Edgington] |
13855 | A conditional does not have truth conditions [Edgington] |
13859 | X believes 'if A, B' to the extent that A & B is more likely than A & ¬B [Edgington] |
13854 | Conditionals express what would be the outcome, given some supposition [Edgington] |
9333 | A priori belief is not necessarily a priori justification, or a priori knowledge [Horwich] |
9342 | Understanding needs a priori commitment [Horwich] |
9332 | Meaning is generated by a priori commitment to truth, not the other way around [Horwich] |
9341 | Meanings and concepts cannot give a priori knowledge, because they may be unacceptable [Horwich] |
9334 | If we stipulate the meaning of 'number' to make Hume's Principle true, we first need Hume's Principle [Horwich] |
9339 | A priori knowledge (e.g. classical logic) may derive from the innate structure of our minds [Horwich] |
3900 | Maybe experience is not essential to perception, but only to the causing of beliefs [Armstrong, by Scruton] |
4253 | Externalism says knowledge involves a natural relation between the belief state and what makes it true [Armstrong] |