Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Stipulation, Meaning and Apriority', 'fragments/reports' and 'Meaning and Reference'

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18 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 13. Against Definition
How do we determine which of the sentences containing a term comprise its definition? [Horwich]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 10. Impossibility
From the necessity of the past we can infer the impossibility of what never happens [Diod.Cronus, by White,MJ]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
The Master Argument seems to prove that only what will happen is possible [Diod.Cronus, by Epictetus]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / d. Non-truthfunction conditionals
Conditionals are true when the antecedent is true, and the consequent has to be true [Diod.Cronus]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 1. A Priori Necessary
A statement can be metaphysically necessary and epistemologically contingent [Putnam]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
Conceivability is no proof of possibility [Putnam]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 1. Nature of the A Priori
A priori belief is not necessarily a priori justification, or a priori knowledge [Horwich]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 6. A Priori from Reason
Understanding needs a priori commitment [Horwich]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 8. A Priori as Analytic
Meaning is generated by a priori commitment to truth, not the other way around [Horwich]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 9. A Priori from Concepts
Meanings and concepts cannot give a priori knowledge, because they may be unacceptable [Horwich]
If we stipulate the meaning of 'number' to make Hume's Principle true, we first need Hume's Principle [Horwich]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 10. A Priori as Subjective
A priori knowledge (e.g. classical logic) may derive from the innate structure of our minds [Horwich]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
I can't distinguish elm trees, but I mean by 'elm' the same set of trees as everybody else [Putnam]
'Water' has an unnoticed indexical component, referring to stuff around here [Putnam]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / c. Social reference
We need to recognise the contribution of society and of the world in determining reference [Putnam]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
Thought is unambiguous, and you should stick to what the speaker thinks they are saying [Diod.Cronus, by Gellius]
19. Language / F. Communication / 4. Private Language
Language is more like a cooperative steamship than an individual hammer [Putnam]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / b. Scientific necessity
If water is H2O in the actual world, there is no possible world where it isn't H2O [Putnam]