18 ideas
| 9331 | How do we determine which of the sentences containing a term comprise its definition? [Horwich] |
| 9455 | Maybe proper names have the content of fixing a thing's category [Bealer] |
| 9454 | The four leading theories of definite descriptions are Frege's, Russell's, Evans's, and Prior's [Bealer] |
| 20475 | Maybe modal sentences cannot be true or false [Casullo] |
| 20476 | If the necessary is a priori, so is the contingent, because the same evidence is involved [Casullo] |
| 9333 | A priori belief is not necessarily a priori justification, or a priori knowledge [Horwich] |
| 20471 | Epistemic a priori conditions concern either the source, defeasibility or strength [Casullo] |
| 20477 | The main claim of defenders of the a priori is that some justifications are non-experiential [Casullo] |
| 20472 | Analysis of the a priori by necessity or analyticity addresses the proposition, not the justification [Casullo] |
| 9342 | Understanding needs a priori commitment [Horwich] |
| 9332 | Meaning is generated by a priori commitment to truth, not the other way around [Horwich] |
| 9341 | Meanings and concepts cannot give a priori knowledge, because they may be unacceptable [Horwich] |
| 9334 | If we stipulate the meaning of 'number' to make Hume's Principle true, we first need Hume's Principle [Horwich] |
| 9339 | A priori knowledge (e.g. classical logic) may derive from the innate structure of our minds [Horwich] |
| 20474 | 'Overriding' defeaters rule it out, and 'undermining' defeaters weaken in [Casullo] |
| 9453 | Sentences saying the same with the same rigid designators may still express different propositions [Bealer] |
| 9452 | Propositions might be reduced to functions (worlds to truth values), or ordered sets of properties and relations [Bealer] |
| 9451 | Modal logic and brain science have reaffirmed traditional belief in propositions [Bealer] |