Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Stipulation, Meaning and Apriority', 'Moral Philosophy meets social psychology' and 'Tarski on Truth and Logical Consequence'

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13 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 13. Against Definition
How do we determine which of the sentences containing a term comprise its definition? [Horwich]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / c. Meta-language for truth
'Snow is white' depends on meaning; whether snow is white depends on snow [Etchemendy]
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 1. Axiomatic Truth
We can get a substantive account of Tarski's truth by adding primitive 'true' to the object language [Etchemendy]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 1. Nature of the A Priori
A priori belief is not necessarily a priori justification, or a priori knowledge [Horwich]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 6. A Priori from Reason
Understanding needs a priori commitment [Horwich]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 8. A Priori as Analytic
Meaning is generated by a priori commitment to truth, not the other way around [Horwich]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 9. A Priori from Concepts
Meanings and concepts cannot give a priori knowledge, because they may be unacceptable [Horwich]
If we stipulate the meaning of 'number' to make Hume's Principle true, we first need Hume's Principle [Horwich]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 10. A Priori as Subjective
A priori knowledge (e.g. classical logic) may derive from the innate structure of our minds [Horwich]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
Maybe consequentialism is a critique of ordinary morality, rather than describing it [Harman]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
Maybe there is no such thing as character, and the virtues and vices said to accompany it [Harman]
If a person's two acts of timidity have different explanations, they are not one character trait [Harman]
Virtue ethics might involve judgements about the virtues of actions, rather than character [Harman]