Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Stipulation, Meaning and Apriority', 'Moral Philosophy meets social psychology' and 'Vagueness, Truth and Logic'

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22 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 6. Logical Analysis
9766 Study vagueness first by its logic, then by its truth-conditions, and then its metaphysics [Fine,K]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 13. Against Definition
9331 How do we determine which of the sentences containing a term comprise its definition? [Horwich]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
9775 Excluded Middle, and classical logic, may fail for vague predicates [Fine,K]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 3. Logical Truth
9771 Logic holding between indefinite sentences is the core of all language [Fine,K]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / d. Vagueness as linguistic
9768 Vagueness is semantic, a deficiency of meaning [Fine,K]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / e. Higher-order vagueness
9776 A thing might be vaguely vague, giving us higher-order vagueness [Fine,K]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / f. Supervaluation for vagueness
9767 A vague sentence is only true for all ways of making it completely precise [Fine,K]
9770 Logical connectives cease to be truth-functional if vagueness is treated with three values [Fine,K]
9772 Meaning is both actual (determining instances) and potential (possibility of greater precision) [Fine,K]
9773 With the super-truth approach, the classical connectives continue to work [Fine,K]
9774 Borderline cases must be under our control, as capable of greater precision [Fine,K]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
9769 Vagueness can be in predicates, names or quantifiers [Fine,K]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 1. Nature of the A Priori
9333 A priori belief is not necessarily a priori justification, or a priori knowledge [Horwich]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 6. A Priori from Reason
9342 Understanding needs a priori commitment [Horwich]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 8. A Priori as Analytic
9332 Meaning is generated by a priori commitment to truth, not the other way around [Horwich]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 9. A Priori from Concepts
9341 Meanings and concepts cannot give a priori knowledge, because they may be unacceptable [Horwich]
9334 If we stipulate the meaning of 'number' to make Hume's Principle true, we first need Hume's Principle [Horwich]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 10. A Priori as Subjective
9339 A priori knowledge (e.g. classical logic) may derive from the innate structure of our minds [Horwich]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
5122 Maybe consequentialism is a critique of ordinary morality, rather than describing it [Harman]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
5123 Maybe there is no such thing as character, and the virtues and vices said to accompany it [Harman]
5124 If a person's two acts of timidity have different explanations, they are not one character trait [Harman]
5125 Virtue ethics might involve judgements about the virtues of actions, rather than character [Harman]