Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Stipulation, Meaning and Apriority', 'The Concept of Mind' and 'Introduction to Mathematical Logic'

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37 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
18005 Philosophy aims to become more disciplined about categories [Ryle]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 13. Against Definition
9331 How do we determine which of the sentences containing a term comprise its definition? [Horwich]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 1. Propositional Logic
17749 Post proved the consistency of propositional logic in 1921 [Walicki]
17765 Propositional language can only relate statements as the same or as different [Walicki]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 3. Truth Tables
17764 Boolean connectives are interpreted as functions on the set {1,0} [Walicki]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / b. Empty (Null) Set
17752 The empty set is useful for defining sets by properties, when the members are not yet known [Walicki]
17753 The empty set avoids having to take special precautions in case members vanish [Walicki]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 6. Ordering in Sets
17759 Ordinals play the central role in set theory, providing the model of well-ordering [Walicki]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
17741 To determine the patterns in logic, one must identify its 'building blocks' [Walicki]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
17747 A 'model' of a theory specifies interpreting a language in a domain to make all theorems true [Walicki]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 3. Löwenheim-Skolem Theorems
17748 The L-S Theorem says no theory (even of reals) says more than a natural number theory [Walicki]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 1. Axiomatisation
17763 Axiomatic systems are purely syntactic, and do not presuppose any interpretation [Walicki]
17761 A compact axiomatisation makes it possible to understand a field as a whole [Walicki]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / e. Ordinal numbers
17757 Members of ordinals are ordinals, and also subsets of ordinals [Walicki]
17758 Ordinals are transitive sets of transitive sets; or transitive sets totally ordered by inclusion [Walicki]
17755 Ordinals are the empty set, union with the singleton, and any arbitrary union of ordinals [Walicki]
17756 The union of finite ordinals is the first 'limit ordinal'; 2ω is the second... [Walicki]
17760 Two infinite ordinals can represent a single infinite cardinal [Walicki]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 3. Axioms for Geometry
17762 In non-Euclidean geometry, all Euclidean theorems are valid that avoid the fifth postulate [Walicki]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / f. Mathematical induction
17754 Inductive proof depends on the choice of the ordering [Walicki]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / e. Dispositions as potential
14297 A dispositional property is not a state, but a liability to be in some state, given a condition [Ryle]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 7. Against Powers
14300 No physical scientist now believes in an occult force-exerting agency [Ryle]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
17742 Scotus based modality on semantic consistency, instead of on what the future could allow [Walicki]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 1. Nature of the A Priori
9333 A priori belief is not necessarily a priori justification, or a priori knowledge [Horwich]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 6. A Priori from Reason
9342 Understanding needs a priori commitment [Horwich]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 8. A Priori as Analytic
9332 Meaning is generated by a priori commitment to truth, not the other way around [Horwich]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 9. A Priori from Concepts
9341 Meanings and concepts cannot give a priori knowledge, because they may be unacceptable [Horwich]
9334 If we stipulate the meaning of 'number' to make Hume's Principle true, we first need Hume's Principle [Horwich]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 10. A Priori as Subjective
9339 A priori knowledge (e.g. classical logic) may derive from the innate structure of our minds [Horwich]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 3. Mental Causation
2622 Can one movement have a mental and physical cause? [Ryle]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 3. Limits of Introspection
1354 We cannot introspect states of anger or panic [Ryle]
1353 Reporting on myself has the same problems as reporting on you [Ryle]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
2624 I cannot prepare myself for the next thought I am going to think [Ryle]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 1. Dualism
2620 Dualism is a category mistake [Ryle]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 2. Potential Behaviour
2388 Behaviour depends on desires as well as beliefs [Chalmers on Ryle]
3354 You can't explain mind as dispositions, if they aren't real [Benardete,JA on Ryle]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
2387 How can behaviour be the cause of behaviour? [Chalmers on Ryle]