20 ideas
| 9331 | How do we determine which of the sentences containing a term comprise its definition? [Horwich] |
| 12756 | Substance is a force for acting and being acted upon [Leibniz] |
| 14637 | Only individuals have essences, so numbers (as a higher type based on classes) lack them [McMichael] |
| 14636 | Essences are the interesting necessary properties resulting from a thing's own peculiar nature [McMichael] |
| 14640 | Maybe essential properties have to be intrinsic, as well as necessary? [McMichael] |
| 14638 | Essentialism is false, because it implies the existence of necessary singular propositions [McMichael] |
| 9333 | A priori belief is not necessarily a priori justification, or a priori knowledge [Horwich] |
| 9342 | Understanding needs a priori commitment [Horwich] |
| 9332 | Meaning is generated by a priori commitment to truth, not the other way around [Horwich] |
| 9341 | Meanings and concepts cannot give a priori knowledge, because they may be unacceptable [Horwich] |
| 9334 | If we stipulate the meaning of 'number' to make Hume's Principle true, we first need Hume's Principle [Horwich] |
| 9339 | A priori knowledge (e.g. classical logic) may derive from the innate structure of our minds [Horwich] |
| 12755 | Final causes can help with explanations in physics [Leibniz] |
| 12760 | Something rather like souls (though not intelligent) could be found everywhere [Leibniz] |
| 12759 | There are atoms of substance, but no atoms of bulk or extension [Leibniz] |
| 12718 | Secondary matter is active and complete; primary matter is passive and incomplete [Leibniz] |
| 14639 | Individuals enter into laws only through their general qualities and relations [McMichael] |
| 11854 | If there is some trace of God in things, that would explain their natural force [Leibniz] |
| 12758 | It is plausible to think substances contain the same immanent force seen in our free will [Leibniz] |
| 19408 | To say that nature or the one universal substance is God is a pernicious doctrine [Leibniz] |