17 ideas
9331 | How do we determine which of the sentences containing a term comprise its definition? [Horwich] |
15571 | The idea of an atemporal realm of validity is as implausible as medieval theology [Heidegger] |
12756 | Substance is a force for acting and being acted upon [Leibniz] |
9333 | A priori belief is not necessarily a priori justification, or a priori knowledge [Horwich] |
9342 | Understanding needs a priori commitment [Horwich] |
9332 | Meaning is generated by a priori commitment to truth, not the other way around [Horwich] |
9341 | Meanings and concepts cannot give a priori knowledge, because they may be unacceptable [Horwich] |
9334 | If we stipulate the meaning of 'number' to make Hume's Principle true, we first need Hume's Principle [Horwich] |
9339 | A priori knowledge (e.g. classical logic) may derive from the innate structure of our minds [Horwich] |
12755 | Final causes can help with explanations in physics [Leibniz] |
12760 | Something rather like souls (though not intelligent) could be found everywhere [Leibniz] |
15581 | Dasein is always only that which it has chosen to be [Heidegger] |
12759 | There are atoms of substance, but no atoms of bulk or extension [Leibniz] |
12718 | Secondary matter is active and complete; primary matter is passive and incomplete [Leibniz] |
11854 | If there is some trace of God in things, that would explain their natural force [Leibniz] |
12758 | It is plausible to think substances contain the same immanent force seen in our free will [Leibniz] |
19408 | To say that nature or the one universal substance is God is a pernicious doctrine [Leibniz] |