Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Stipulation, Meaning and Apriority', 'The Big Book of Concepts' and 'On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood'

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33 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 13. Against Definition
How do we determine which of the sentences containing a term comprise its definition? [Horwich]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
For Russell, both propositions and facts are arrangements of objects, so obviously they correspond [Horwich on Russell]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 1. Nature of the A Priori
A priori belief is not necessarily a priori justification, or a priori knowledge [Horwich]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 6. A Priori from Reason
Understanding needs a priori commitment [Horwich]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 8. A Priori as Analytic
Meaning is generated by a priori commitment to truth, not the other way around [Horwich]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 9. A Priori from Concepts
Meanings and concepts cannot give a priori knowledge, because they may be unacceptable [Horwich]
If we stipulate the meaning of 'number' to make Hume's Principle true, we first need Hume's Principle [Horwich]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 10. A Priori as Subjective
A priori knowledge (e.g. classical logic) may derive from the innate structure of our minds [Horwich]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 5. Interpretation
Research shows perceptual discrimination is sharper at category boundaries [Murphy]
14. Science / C. Induction / 1. Induction
Induction is said to just compare properties of categories, but the type of property also matters [Murphy]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / a. Nature of concepts
The main theories of concepts are exemplar, prototype and knowledge [Murphy]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / c. Classical concepts
The classical definitional approach cannot distinguish typical and atypical category members [Murphy]
Classical concepts follow classical logic, but concepts in real life don't work that way [Murphy]
Classical concepts are transitive hierarchies, but actual categories may be intransitive [Murphy]
The classical core is meant to be the real concept, but actually seems unimportant [Murphy]
The theoretical and practical definitions for the classical view are very hard to find [Murphy]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / d. Concepts as prototypes
There is no 'ideal' bird or dog, and prototypes give no information about variability [Murphy]
Prototypes are unified representations of the entire category (rather than of members) [Murphy]
The prototype theory uses observed features, but can't include their construction [Murphy]
The prototype theory handles hierarchical categories and combinations of concepts well [Murphy]
Prototypes theory of concepts is best, as a full description with weighted typical features [Murphy]
Learning concepts is forming prototypes with a knowledge structure [Murphy]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / e. Concepts from exemplars
The exemplar view of concepts says 'dogs' is the set of dogs I remember [Murphy]
Children using knowing and essentialist categories doesn't fit the exemplar view [Murphy]
Exemplar theory struggles with hierarchical classification and with induction [Murphy]
Conceptual combination must be compositional, and can't be built up from exemplars [Murphy]
The concept of birds from exemplars must also be used in inductions about birds [Murphy]
The most popular theories of concepts are based on prototypes or exemplars [Murphy]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / f. Theory theory of concepts
We do not learn concepts in isolation, but as an integrated part of broader knowledge [Murphy]
Concepts with familiar contents are easier to learn [Murphy]
Some knowledge is involved in instant use of categories, other knowledge in explanations [Murphy]
People categorise things consistent with their knowledge, even rejecting some good evidence [Murphy]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 6. Propositions Critique
In 1906, Russell decided that propositions did not, after all, exist [Russell, by Monk]