19 ideas
9331 | How do we determine which of the sentences containing a term comprise its definition? [Horwich] |
19528 | Knowledge is prior to believing, just as doing is prior to trying to do [Williamson] |
19527 | We don't acquire evidence and then derive some knowledge, because evidence IS knowledge [Williamson] |
19529 | Belief explains justification, and knowledge explains belief, so knowledge explains justification [Williamson] |
19536 | Knowledge-first says your total evidence IS your knowledge [Williamson] |
19530 | A neutral state of experience, between error and knowledge, is not basic; the successful state is basic [Williamson] |
19531 | Internalism about mind is an obsolete view, and knowledge-first epistemology develops externalism [Williamson] |
19526 | Surely I am acquainted with physical objects, not with appearances? [Williamson] |
9333 | A priori belief is not necessarily a priori justification, or a priori knowledge [Horwich] |
9342 | Understanding needs a priori commitment [Horwich] |
9332 | Meaning is generated by a priori commitment to truth, not the other way around [Horwich] |
9341 | Meanings and concepts cannot give a priori knowledge, because they may be unacceptable [Horwich] |
9334 | If we stipulate the meaning of 'number' to make Hume's Principle true, we first need Hume's Principle [Horwich] |
9339 | A priori knowledge (e.g. classical logic) may derive from the innate structure of our minds [Horwich] |
19534 | How does inferentialism distinguish the patterns of inference that are essential to meaning? [Williamson] |
19535 | Internalist inferentialism has trouble explaining how meaning and reference relate [Williamson] |
19533 | Inferentialist semantics relies on internal inference relations, not on external references [Williamson] |
19532 | Truth-conditional referential semantics is externalist, referring to worldly items [Williamson] |
1658 | In early Greece the word for punishment was also the word for vengeance [Vlastos] |