Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Stipulation, Meaning and Apriority', 'Probability and Logic of Rational Belief' and 'Vagueness'

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11 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 13. Against Definition
9331 How do we determine which of the sentences containing a term comprise its definition? [Horwich]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
21597 Logical connectives have the highest precision, yet are infected by the vagueness of true and false [Russell, by Williamson]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 4. Paradoxes in Logic / e. The Lottery paradox
6368 If my ticket won't win the lottery (and it won't), no other tickets will either [Kyburg, by Pollock/Cruz]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / d. Vagueness as linguistic
9051 Since natural language is not precise it cannot be in the province of logic [Russell, by Keefe/Smith]
9054 Vagueness is only a characteristic of representations, such as language [Russell]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 1. Nature of the A Priori
9333 A priori belief is not necessarily a priori justification, or a priori knowledge [Horwich]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 6. A Priori from Reason
9342 Understanding needs a priori commitment [Horwich]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 8. A Priori as Analytic
9332 Meaning is generated by a priori commitment to truth, not the other way around [Horwich]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 9. A Priori from Concepts
9341 Meanings and concepts cannot give a priori knowledge, because they may be unacceptable [Horwich]
9334 If we stipulate the meaning of 'number' to make Hume's Principle true, we first need Hume's Principle [Horwich]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 10. A Priori as Subjective
9339 A priori knowledge (e.g. classical logic) may derive from the innate structure of our minds [Horwich]