13 ideas
9331 | How do we determine which of the sentences containing a term comprise its definition? [Horwich] |
12452 | Our dislike of contradiction in logic is a matter of psychology, not mathematics [Brouwer] |
6368 | If my ticket won't win the lottery (and it won't), no other tickets will either [Kyburg, by Pollock/Cruz] |
12451 | Scientific laws largely rest on the results of counting and measuring [Brouwer] |
12454 | Intuitionists only accept denumerable sets [Brouwer] |
12453 | Neo-intuitionism abstracts from the reuniting of moments, to intuit bare two-oneness [Brouwer] |
9333 | A priori belief is not necessarily a priori justification, or a priori knowledge [Horwich] |
9342 | Understanding needs a priori commitment [Horwich] |
9332 | Meaning is generated by a priori commitment to truth, not the other way around [Horwich] |
9341 | Meanings and concepts cannot give a priori knowledge, because they may be unacceptable [Horwich] |
9334 | If we stipulate the meaning of 'number' to make Hume's Principle true, we first need Hume's Principle [Horwich] |
9339 | A priori knowledge (e.g. classical logic) may derive from the innate structure of our minds [Horwich] |
10117 | Intuitonists in mathematics worried about unjustified assertion, as well as contradiction [Brouwer, by George/Velleman] |