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All the ideas for 'Stipulation, Meaning and Apriority', 'Sense and Sensibilia' and 'works'

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12 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 13. Against Definition
9331 How do we determine which of the sentences containing a term comprise its definition? [Horwich]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 1. Mathematics
8717 Hilbert wanted to prove the consistency of all of mathematics (which realists take for granted) [Hilbert, by Friend]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 7. Formalism
10113 The grounding of mathematics is 'in the beginning was the sign' [Hilbert]
10115 Hilbert substituted a syntactic for a semantic account of consistency [Hilbert, by George/Velleman]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 8. Finitism
10116 Hilbert aimed to prove the consistency of mathematics finitely, to show infinities won't produce contradictions [Hilbert, by George/Velleman]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / a. Problem of vagueness
21598 Austin revealed many meanings for 'vague': rough, ambiguous, general, incomplete... [Austin,JL, by Williamson]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 1. Nature of the A Priori
9333 A priori belief is not necessarily a priori justification, or a priori knowledge [Horwich]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 6. A Priori from Reason
9342 Understanding needs a priori commitment [Horwich]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 8. A Priori as Analytic
9332 Meaning is generated by a priori commitment to truth, not the other way around [Horwich]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 9. A Priori from Concepts
9341 Meanings and concepts cannot give a priori knowledge, because they may be unacceptable [Horwich]
9334 If we stipulate the meaning of 'number' to make Hume's Principle true, we first need Hume's Principle [Horwich]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 10. A Priori as Subjective
9339 A priori knowledge (e.g. classical logic) may derive from the innate structure of our minds [Horwich]