Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Stipulation, Meaning and Apriority', 'There is immediate Justification' and 'Replies on 'Limits of Abstraction''

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27 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 7. Limitations of Analysis
10571 Concern for rigour can get in the way of understanding phenomena [Fine,K]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 13. Against Definition
9331 How do we determine which of the sentences containing a term comprise its definition? [Horwich]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / e. Iterative sets
10565 There is no stage at which we can take all the sets to have been generated [Fine,K]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 3. Axioms of Mereology
10564 We might combine the axioms of set theory with the axioms of mereology [Fine,K]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 5. Second-Order Quantification
10569 If you ask what F the second-order quantifier quantifies over, you treat it as first-order [Fine,K]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 1. Semantics of Logic
10570 Assigning an entity to each predicate in semantics is largely a technical convenience [Fine,K]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / b. Types of number
10573 Dedekind cuts lead to the bizarre idea that there are many different number 1's [Fine,K]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / i. Reals from cuts
10575 Why should a Dedekind cut correspond to a number? [Fine,K]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / l. Zero
10574 Unless we know whether 0 is identical with the null set, we create confusions [Fine,K]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / b. Mathematics is not set theory
10560 Set-theoretic imperialists think sets can represent every mathematical object [Fine,K]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism
10568 Logicists say mathematics can be derived from definitions, and can be known that way [Fine,K]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / b. Levels of abstraction
10563 A generative conception of abstracts proposes stages, based on concepts of previous objects [Fine,K]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 1. Nature of the A Priori
9333 A priori belief is not necessarily a priori justification, or a priori knowledge [Horwich]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 6. A Priori from Reason
9342 Understanding needs a priori commitment [Horwich]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 8. A Priori as Analytic
9332 Meaning is generated by a priori commitment to truth, not the other way around [Horwich]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 9. A Priori from Concepts
9341 Meanings and concepts cannot give a priori knowledge, because they may be unacceptable [Horwich]
9334 If we stipulate the meaning of 'number' to make Hume's Principle true, we first need Hume's Principle [Horwich]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 10. A Priori as Subjective
9339 A priori knowledge (e.g. classical logic) may derive from the innate structure of our minds [Horwich]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs
8845 An experience's having propositional content doesn't make it a belief [Pryor]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / e. Pro-foundations
8842 The best argument for immediate justification is not the Regress Argument, but considering examples [Pryor]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
8843 Impure coherentists accept that perceptions can justify, unlike pure coherentists [Pryor]
8844 Coherentism rests on the claim that justifications must be beliefs, with propositional content [Pryor]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / b. Pro-coherentism
8846 Reasons for beliefs can be cited to others, unlike a raw headache experience [Pryor]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 5. Controlling Beliefs
8847 Beliefs are not chosen, but you can seek ways to influence your belief [Pryor]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 7. Abstracta by Equivalence
10561 Abstraction-theoretic imperialists think Fregean abstracts can represent every mathematical object [Fine,K]
10562 We can combine ZF sets with abstracts as urelements [Fine,K]
10567 We can create objects from conditions, rather than from concepts [Fine,K]