65 ideas
16241 | The metaphysics of nature should focus on physics [Maudlin] |
16257 | Kant survives in seeing metaphysics as analysing our conceptual system, which is a priori [Maudlin] |
16276 | Wide metaphysical possibility may reduce metaphysics to analysis of fantasies [Maudlin] |
16244 | If the universe is profligate, the Razor leads us astray [Maudlin] |
16255 | The Razor rightly prefers one cause of multiple events to coincidences of causes [Maudlin] |
9331 | How do we determine which of the sentences containing a term comprise its definition? [Horwich] |
16243 | The Humean view is wrong; laws and direction of time are primitive, and atoms are decided by physics [Maudlin] |
16271 | Lewis says it supervenes on the Mosaic, but actually thinks the Mosaic is all there is [Maudlin] |
16273 | If the Humean Mosaic is ontological bedrock, there can be no explanation of its structure [Maudlin] |
16275 | The 'spinning disc' is just impossible, because there cannot be 'homogeneous matter' [Maudlin] |
16258 | To get an ontology from ontological commitment, just add that some theory is actually true [Maudlin] |
16259 | Naïve translation from natural to formal language can hide or multiply the ontology [Maudlin] |
16253 | A property is fundamental if two objects can differ in only that respect [Maudlin] |
16263 | Fundamental physics seems to suggest there are no such things as properties [Maudlin] |
16260 | Existence of universals may just be decided by acceptance, or not, of second-order logic [Maudlin] |
16277 | Logically impossible is metaphysically impossible, but logically possible is not metaphysically possible [Maudlin] |
16249 | A counterfactual antecedent commands the redescription of a selected moment [Maudlin] |
9333 | A priori belief is not necessarily a priori justification, or a priori knowledge [Horwich] |
9342 | Understanding needs a priori commitment [Horwich] |
9332 | Meaning is generated by a priori commitment to truth, not the other way around [Horwich] |
9341 | Meanings and concepts cannot give a priori knowledge, because they may be unacceptable [Horwich] |
9334 | If we stipulate the meaning of 'number' to make Hume's Principle true, we first need Hume's Principle [Horwich] |
9339 | A priori knowledge (e.g. classical logic) may derive from the innate structure of our minds [Horwich] |
16254 | Induction leaps into the unknown, but usually lands safely [Maudlin] |
16245 | Laws should help explain the things they govern, or that manifest them [Maudlin] |
22849 | Rawls's theory cannot justify liberalism, since it presupposes free and equal participants [Charvet] |
22848 | People with strong prior beliefs would have nothing to do with a veil of ignorance [Charvet] |
22838 | Societies need shared values, so conservatism is right if rational discussion of values is impossible [Charvet] |
22846 | The universalism of utilitarianism implies a world state [Charvet] |
22835 | Liberals value freedom and equality, but the society itself must decide on its values [Charvet] |
22831 | Modern libertarian societies still provide education and some housing [Charvet] |
22839 | Liberalism needs people to either have equal autonomy, or everyone to have enough autonomy [Charvet] |
22847 | Kant places a higher value on the universal rational will than on the people asserting it [Charvet] |
22821 | Liberalism asserts maximum freedom, but that must be equal for all participants [Charvet] |
22834 | Egalitarian liberals prefer equality (either of input or outcome) to liberty [Charvet] |
22822 | Liberals promote community and well-being - because all good societies need them [Charvet] |
22841 | Identity multiculturalism emerges from communitarianism, preferring community to humanity [Charvet] |
22842 | For communitarians it seems that you must accept the culture you are born into [Charvet] |
22830 | Give by ability and receive by need, rather than a free labour market [Charvet] |
22829 | Allowing defamatory speech is against society's interests, by blurring which people are trustworthy [Charvet] |
22836 | 'Freedom from' is an empty idea, if the freedom is not from impediments to my desires [Charvet] |
22837 | Positive freedom can lead to coercion, if you are forced to do what you chose to do [Charvet] |
22844 | First level autonomy is application of personal values; second level is criticising them [Charvet] |
22840 | Mere equality, as in two trees being the same height, has no value at all [Charvet] |
22843 | Inequalities are worse if they seem to be your fault, rather than social facts [Charvet] |
22845 | Money allows unlimited inequalities, and we obviously all agree to money [Charvet] |
22823 | The rule of law is mainly to restrict governments [Charvet] |
22825 | The 1689 Bill of Rights denied the monarch new courts, or the right to sit as judge [Charvet] |
22826 | From 1701 only parliament could remove judges, whose decisions could not be discussed [Charvet] |
22827 | Justice superior to the rule of law is claimed on behalf of the workers, or the will of the nation [Charvet] |
22828 | The rule of law mainly benefits those with property and liberties [Charvet] |
22832 | Welfare is needed if citizens are to accept the obligations of a liberal state [Charvet] |
16248 | Evaluating counterfactuals involves context and interests [Maudlin] |
16250 | We don't pick a similar world from many - we construct one possibility from the description [Maudlin] |
16268 | The counterfactual is ruined if some other cause steps in when the antecedent fails [Maudlin] |
16267 | If we know the cause of an event, we seem to assent to the counterfactual [Maudlin] |
16269 | If the effect hadn't occurred the cause wouldn't have happened, so counterfactuals are two-way [Maudlin] |
16247 | Laws are primitive, so two indiscernible worlds could have the same laws [Maudlin] |
16272 | Fundamental laws say how nature will, or might, evolve from some initial state [Maudlin] |
16242 | Laws of nature are ontological bedrock, and beyond analysis [Maudlin] |
16251 | 'Humans with prime house numbers are mortal' is not a law, because not a natural kind [Maudlin] |
16270 | If laws are just regularities, then there have to be laws [Maudlin] |
16264 | I believe the passing of time is a fundamental fact about the world [Maudlin] |
16265 | If time passes, presumably it passes at one second per second [Maudlin] |
16266 | There is one ordered B series, but an infinitude of A series, depending on when the present is [Maudlin] |