Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Stipulation, Meaning and Apriority', 'The Disorder of Things' and 'Brainstorms:Essays on Mind and Psychology'

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26 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 13. Against Definition
9331 How do we determine which of the sentences containing a term comprise its definition? [Horwich]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 1. Categories
17377 All descriptive language is classificatory [Dupré]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 2. Categorisation
17376 We should aim for a classification which tells us as much as possible about the object [Dupré]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
17390 Natural kinds don't need essentialism to be explanatory [Dupré]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 10. Essence as Species
17389 A species might have its essential genetic mechanism replaced by a new one [Dupré]
17388 It seems that species lack essential properties, so they can't be natural kinds [Dupré]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 1. Nature of the A Priori
9333 A priori belief is not necessarily a priori justification, or a priori knowledge [Horwich]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 6. A Priori from Reason
9342 Understanding needs a priori commitment [Horwich]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 8. A Priori as Analytic
9332 Meaning is generated by a priori commitment to truth, not the other way around [Horwich]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 9. A Priori from Concepts
9341 Meanings and concepts cannot give a priori knowledge, because they may be unacceptable [Horwich]
9334 If we stipulate the meaning of 'number' to make Hume's Principle true, we first need Hume's Principle [Horwich]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 10. A Priori as Subjective
9339 A priori knowledge (e.g. classical logic) may derive from the innate structure of our minds [Horwich]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 4. Prediction
17374 The possibility of prediction rests on determinism [Dupré]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
3158 Theories of intentionality presuppose rationality, so can't explain it [Dennett]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 3. Intentional Stance
3159 Beliefs and desires aren't real; they are prediction techniques [Dennett]
18. Thought / C. Content / 5. Twin Earth
17378 Presumably molecular structure seems important because we never have the Twin Earth experience [Dupré]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 1. Natural Kinds
17381 Phylogenetics involves history, and cladism rests species on splits in lineage [Dupré]
17385 Kinds don't do anything (including evolve) because they are abstract [Dupré]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 7. Critique of Kinds
17375 Natural kinds are decided entirely by the intentions of our classification [Dupré]
17379 Borders between species are much less clear in vegetables than among animals [Dupré]
17384 Even atoms of an element differ, in the energy levels of their electrons [Dupré]
17387 Ecologists favour classifying by niche, even though that can clash with genealogy [Dupré]
17382 Cooks, unlike scientists, distinguish garlic from onions [Dupré]
17380 Wales may count as fish [Dupré]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 5. Species
17383 Species are the lowest-level classification in biology [Dupré]
17386 The theory of evolution is mainly about species [Dupré]