Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Stipulation, Meaning and Apriority', 'Letters to William Molyneux' and 'The Thought: a Logical Enquiry'

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21 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
There exists a realm, beyond objects and ideas, of non-spatio-temporal thoughts [Frege, by Weiner]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 13. Against Definition
How do we determine which of the sentences containing a term comprise its definition? [Horwich]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
The word 'true' seems to be unique and indefinable [Frege]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
There cannot be complete correspondence, because ideas and reality are quite different [Frege]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 1. Redundant Truth
The property of truth in 'It is true that I smell violets' adds nothing to 'I smell violets' [Frege]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 2. Types of Existence
Thoughts in the 'third realm' cannot be sensed, and do not need an owner to exist [Frege]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / c. Facts and truths
A fact is a thought that is true [Frege]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 3. Objects in Thought
Late Frege saw his non-actual objective objects as exclusively thoughts and senses [Frege, by Dummett]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 13. Nominal Essence
Things have real essences, but we categorise them according to the ideas we receive [Locke]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 1. Nature of the A Priori
A priori belief is not necessarily a priori justification, or a priori knowledge [Horwich]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 6. A Priori from Reason
Understanding needs a priori commitment [Horwich]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 8. A Priori as Analytic
Meaning is generated by a priori commitment to truth, not the other way around [Horwich]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 9. A Priori from Concepts
Meanings and concepts cannot give a priori knowledge, because they may be unacceptable [Horwich]
If we stipulate the meaning of 'number' to make Hume's Principle true, we first need Hume's Principle [Horwich]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 10. A Priori as Subjective
A priori knowledge (e.g. classical logic) may derive from the innate structure of our minds [Horwich]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
We grasp thoughts (thinking), decide they are true (judgement), and manifest the judgement (assertion) [Frege]
Thoughts have their own realm of reality - 'sense' (as opposed to the realm of 'reference') [Frege, by Dummett]
A thought is distinguished from other things by a capacity to be true or false [Frege, by Dummett]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 9. Indexical Thought
Thoughts about myself are understood one way to me, and another when communicated [Frege]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / a. Propositions as sense
A 'thought' is something for which the question of truth can arise; thoughts are senses of sentences [Frege]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 5. Unity of Propositions
A sentence is only a thought if it is complete, and has a time-specification [Frege]