88 ideas
15010 | Your metaphysics is 'cheating' if your ontology won't support the beliefs you accept [Sider] |
14977 | Metaphysics is not about what exists or is true or essential; it is about the structure of reality [Sider] |
14994 | Extreme doubts about metaphysics also threaten to undermine the science of unobservables [Sider] |
15003 | It seems unlikely that the way we speak will give insights into the universe [Sider] |
14986 | Conceptual analysts trust particular intuitions much more than general ones [Sider] |
15015 | It seems possible for a correct definition to be factually incorrect, as in defining 'contact' [Sider] |
9331 | How do we determine which of the sentences containing a term comprise its definition? [Horwich] |
14981 | Philosophical concepts are rarely defined, and are not understood by means of definitions [Sider] |
14992 | We don't care about plain truth, but truth in joint-carving terms [Sider] |
15012 | Orthodox truthmaker theories make entities fundamental, but that is poor for explanation [Sider] |
15023 | The Barcan schema implies if X might have fathered something, there is something X might have fathered [Sider] |
15004 | 'Gunk' is an object in which proper parts all endlessly have further proper parts [Sider] |
14984 | Which should be primitive in mereology - part, or overlap? [Sider] |
14980 | There is a real issue over what is the 'correct' logic [Sider] |
15000 | 'It is raining' and 'it is not raining' can't be legislated, so we can't legislate 'p or ¬p' [Sider] |
15020 | Classical logic is good for mathematics and science, but less good for natural language [Sider] |
15029 | Modal accounts of logical consequence are simple necessity, or essential use of logical words [Sider] |
15019 | Define logical constants by role in proofs, or as fixed in meaning, or as topic-neutral [Sider] |
15001 | 'Tonk' is supposed to follow the elimination and introduction rules, but it can't be so interpreted [Sider] |
15017 | Supervenience is a modal connection [Sider] |
15008 | Is fundamentality in whole propositions (and holistic), or in concepts (and atomic)? [Sider] |
15013 | Tables and chairs have fundamental existence, but not fundamental natures [Sider] |
15014 | Unlike things, stuff obeys unrestricted composition and mereological essentialism [Sider] |
15009 | We must distinguish 'concrete' from 'abstract' and necessary states of affairs. [Sider] |
14983 | Accept the ontology of your best theory - and also that it carves nature at the joints [Sider] |
14978 | A property is intrinsic if an object alone in the world can instantiate it [Sider] |
14995 | Predicates can be 'sparse' if there is a universal, or if there is a natural property or relation [Sider] |
15026 | Essence (even if nonmodal) is not fundamental in metaphysics [Sider] |
15030 | Humeans say that we decide what is necessary [Sider] |
15031 | Modal terms in English are entirely contextual, with no modality outside the language [Sider] |
15027 | If truths are necessary 'by convention', that seems to make them contingent [Sider] |
15028 | Conventionalism doesn't seem to apply to examples of the necessary a posteriori [Sider] |
15033 | Humeans says mathematics and logic are necessary because that is how our concept of necessity works [Sider] |
15025 | The world does not contain necessity and possibility - merely how things are [Sider] |
9333 | A priori belief is not necessarily a priori justification, or a priori knowledge [Horwich] |
9342 | Understanding needs a priori commitment [Horwich] |
9332 | Meaning is generated by a priori commitment to truth, not the other way around [Horwich] |
9341 | Meanings and concepts cannot give a priori knowledge, because they may be unacceptable [Horwich] |
9334 | If we stipulate the meaning of 'number' to make Hume's Principle true, we first need Hume's Principle [Horwich] |
9339 | A priori knowledge (e.g. classical logic) may derive from the innate structure of our minds [Horwich] |
14988 | A theory which doesn't fit nature is unexplanatory, even if it is true [Sider] |
14982 | If I used Ramsey sentences to eliminate fundamentality from my theory, that would be a real loss [Sider] |
14989 | Problem predicates in induction don't reflect the structure of nature [Sider] |
14997 | Two applications of 'grue' do not guarantee a similarity between two things [Sider] |
14990 | Bayes produces weird results if the prior probabilities are bizarre [Sider] |
15005 | Explanations must cite generalisations [Sider] |
15011 | If the ultimate explanation is a list of entities, no laws, patterns or mechanisms can be cited [Sider] |
15018 | Intentionality is too superficial to appear in the catalogue of ultimate physics [Sider] |
14999 | Prior to conventions, not all green things were green? [Sider] |
14998 | Conventions are contingent and analytic truths are necessary, so that isn't their explanation [Sider] |
15016 | Analyticity has lost its traditional role, which relied on truth by convention [Sider] |
20489 | Human beings can never really flourish in a long-term state of nature [Wolff,J] |
20483 | Collective rationality is individuals doing their best, assuming others all do the same [Wolff,J] |
20532 | Should love be the first virtue of a society, as it is of the family? [Wolff,J] |
20490 | For utilitarians, consent to the state is irrelevant, if it produces more happiness [Wolff,J] |
20493 | Social contract theory has the attracton of including everyone, and being voluntary [Wolff,J] |
20494 | Maybe voting in elections is a grant of legitimacy to the winners [Wolff,J] |
20500 | We can see the 'general will' as what is in the general interest [Wolff,J] |
20497 | How can dictators advance the interests of the people, if they don't consult them about interests? [Wolff,J] |
20506 | 'Separation of powers' allows legislative, executive and judicial functions to monitor one another [Wolff,J] |
20530 | Political choice can be by utility, or maximin, or maximax [Wolff,J] |
20487 | A realistic and less utopian anarchism looks increasingly like liberal democracy [Wolff,J] |
20488 | It is hard for anarchists to deny that we need experts [Wolff,J] |
20529 | Utilitarianism probably implies a free market plus welfare [Wolff,J] |
20510 | A system of democracy which includes both freedom and equality is almost impossible [Wolff,J] |
20511 | Democracy expresses equal respect (which explains why criminals forfeit the vote) [Wolff,J] |
20502 | Democracy has been seen as consistent with many types of inequality [Wolff,J] |
20496 | A true democracy could not tolerate slavery, exploitation or colonialism [Wolff,J] |
20498 | We should decide whether voting is for self-interests, or for the common good [Wolff,J] |
20499 | Condorcet proved that sensible voting leads to an emphatically right answer [Wolff,J] |
20509 | Occasional defeat is acceptable, but a minority that is continually defeated is a problem [Wolff,J] |
20524 | Market prices indicate shortages and gluts, and where the profits are to be made [Wolff,J] |
20518 | Liberty principles can't justify laws against duelling, incest between siblings and euthanasia [Wolff,J] |
20531 | Either Difference allows unequal liberty, or Liberty makes implementing Difference impossible [Wolff,J] |
20526 | Utilitarians argue for equal distribution because of diminishing utility of repetition [Wolff,J] |
20528 | Difference Principle: all inequalities should be in favour of the disadvantaged [Wolff,J] |
20503 | Political equality is not much use without social equality [Wolff,J] |
20512 | Standard rights: life, free speech, assembly, movement, vote, stand (plus shelter, food, health?) [Wolff,J] |
20513 | If natural rights are axiomatic, there is then no way we can defend them [Wolff,J] |
20514 | If rights are natural, rather than inferred, how do we know which rights we have? [Wolff,J] |
20522 | Utilitarians might say property ownership encourages the best use of the land [Wolff,J] |
20534 | Rights and justice are only the last resorts of a society, something to fall back on [Wolff,J] |
20492 | Following some laws is not a moral matter; trivial traffic rules, for example [Wolff,J] |
14985 | The notion of law doesn't seem to enhance physical theories [Sider] |
14987 | Many of the key theories of modern physics do not appear to be 'laws' [Sider] |
14991 | Space has real betweenness and congruence structure (though it is not the Euclidean concepts) [Sider] |
15021 | The central question in the philosophy of time is: How alike are time and space? [Sider] |
15024 | The spotlight theorists accepts eternal time, but with a spotlight of the present moving across it [Sider] |