16 ideas
| 9331 | How do we determine which of the sentences containing a term comprise its definition? [Horwich] |
| 14263 | Strong Kleene disjunction just needs one true disjunct; Weak needs the other to have some value [Fine,K] |
| 15565 | Events have inbuilt essences, as necessary conditions for their occurrence [Lewis] |
| 15566 | Events are classes, and so there is a mereology of their parts [Lewis] |
| 15567 | Some events involve no change; they must, because causal histories involve unchanges [Lewis] |
| 15561 | The events that suit semantics may not be the events that suit causation [Lewis] |
| 15564 | An event is a property of a unique space-time region [Lewis] |
| 14262 | Formal grounding needs transitivity of grounding, no self-grounding, and the existence of both parties [Fine,K] |
| 15563 | Properties are very abundant (unlike universals), and are used for semantics and higher-order variables [Lewis] |
| 9333 | A priori belief is not necessarily a priori justification, or a priori knowledge [Horwich] |
| 9342 | Understanding needs a priori commitment [Horwich] |
| 9332 | Meaning is generated by a priori commitment to truth, not the other way around [Horwich] |
| 9341 | Meanings and concepts cannot give a priori knowledge, because they may be unacceptable [Horwich] |
| 9334 | If we stipulate the meaning of 'number' to make Hume's Principle true, we first need Hume's Principle [Horwich] |
| 9339 | A priori knowledge (e.g. classical logic) may derive from the innate structure of our minds [Horwich] |
| 15562 | Causation is a general relation derived from instances of causal dependence [Lewis] |