11 ideas
| 12302 | Definitions formed an abstract hierarchy for Aristotle, as sets do for us [Fine,K] |
| 14266 | Aristotle sees hierarchies in definitions using genus and differentia (as we see them in sets) [Fine,K] |
| 14268 | Maybe bottom-up grounding shows constitution, and top-down grounding shows essence [Fine,K] |
| 14267 | There is no distinctive idea of constitution, because you can't say constitution begins and ends [Fine,K] |
| 14264 | Is there a plausible Aristotelian notion of constitution, applicable to both physical and non-physical? [Fine,K] |
| 8431 | Problems with Goodman's view of counterfactuals led to a radical approach from Stalnaker and Lewis [Horwich] |
| 21386 | We should accept as explanations all the plausible ways in which something could come about [Epicurus] |
| 14265 | The components of abstract definitions could play the same role as matter for physical objects [Fine,K] |
| 8432 | Analyse counterfactuals using causation, not the other way around [Horwich] |
| 14051 | A cosmos is a collection of stars and an earth, with some sort of boundary, movement and shape [Epicurus] |
| 1828 | God does not intervene in heavenly movements, but is beyond all action and perfectly happy [Epicurus] |