Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Stipulation, Meaning and Apriority', 'Semantic Relationism' and 'True in Theory, but not in Practice'

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39 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 13. Against Definition
9331 How do we determine which of the sentences containing a term comprise its definition? [Horwich]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 4. Variables in Logic
15592 The usual Tarskian interpretation of variables is to specify their range of values [Fine,K]
15593 Variables can be viewed as special terms - functions taking assignments into individuals [Fine,K]
15590 It seemed that Frege gave the syntax for variables, and Tarski the semantics, and that was that [Fine,K]
15591 In separate expressions variables seem identical in role, but in the same expression they aren't [Fine,K]
15595 The 'algebraic' account of variables reduces quantification to the algebra of its component parts [Fine,K]
15594 'Instantial' accounts of variables say we grasp arbitrary instances from their use in quantification [Fine,K]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
15599 Cicero/Cicero and Cicero/Tully may differ in relationship, despite being semantically the same [Fine,K]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
15603 I can only represent individuals as the same if I do not already represent them as the same [Fine,K]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
15604 If Cicero=Tully refers to the man twice, then surely Cicero=Cicero does as well? [Fine,K]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 1. Nature of the A Priori
9333 A priori belief is not necessarily a priori justification, or a priori knowledge [Horwich]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 6. A Priori from Reason
9342 Understanding needs a priori commitment [Horwich]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 8. A Priori as Analytic
9332 Meaning is generated by a priori commitment to truth, not the other way around [Horwich]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 9. A Priori from Concepts
9341 Meanings and concepts cannot give a priori knowledge, because they may be unacceptable [Horwich]
9334 If we stipulate the meaning of 'number' to make Hume's Principle true, we first need Hume's Principle [Horwich]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 10. A Priori as Subjective
9339 A priori knowledge (e.g. classical logic) may derive from the innate structure of our minds [Horwich]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 5. Mental Files
15602 Mental files are devices for keeping track of basic coordination of objects [Fine,K]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
15588 You cannot determine the full content from a thought's intrinsic character, as relations are involved [Fine,K]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
15596 The standard aim of semantics is to assign a semantic value to each expression [Fine,K]
15587 That two utterances say the same thing may not be intrinsic to them, but involve their relationships [Fine,K]
15589 The two main theories are Holism (which is inferential), and Representational (which is atomistic) [Fine,K]
15598 We should pursue semantic facts as stated by truths in theories (and not put the theories first!) [Fine,K]
15600 Referentialist semantics has objects for names, properties for predicates, and propositions for connectives [Fine,K]
15601 Fregeans approach the world through sense, Referentialists through reference [Fine,K]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 9. Indexical Semantics
15605 I take indexicals such as 'this' and 'that' to be linked to some associated demonstration [Fine,K]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason
21059 General rules of action also need a judgement about when to apply them [Kant]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / c. Value of happiness
21061 Duty does not aim at an end, but gives rise to universal happiness as aim of the will [Kant]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
21060 It can't be a duty to strive after the impossible [Kant]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 6. Motivation for Duty
21062 The will's motive is the absolute law itself, and moral feeling is receptivity to law [Kant]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 3. Natural Values / c. Natural rights
21071 There can be no restraints on freedom if reason does not reveal some basic rights [Kant]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / c. Social contract
21063 Personal contracts are for some end, but a civil state contract involves a duty to share [Kant]
21068 There must be a unanimous contract that citizens accept majority decisions [Kant]
21069 A contract is theoretical, but it can guide rulers to make laws which the whole people will accept [Kant]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / d. General will
21070 A law is unjust if the whole people could not possibly agree to it [Kant]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 4. Citizenship
21067 A citizen must control his own life, and possess property or an important skill [Kant]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / a. Liberalism basics
21064 A lawful civil state must embody freedom, equality and independence for its members [Kant]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 4. Economic equality
21066 Citizens can rise to any rank that talent, effort and luck can achieve [Kant]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 3. Alienating rights
21065 You can't make a contract renouncing your right to make contracts! [Kant]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / a. Just wars
21072 The people (who have to fight) and not the head of state should declare a war [Kant]