14 ideas
9331 | How do we determine which of the sentences containing a term comprise its definition? [Horwich] |
11074 | 'It is true that this follows' means simply: this follows [Wittgenstein] |
11073 | Two and one making three has the necessity of logical inference [Wittgenstein] |
9333 | A priori belief is not necessarily a priori justification, or a priori knowledge [Horwich] |
9342 | Understanding needs a priori commitment [Horwich] |
9332 | Meaning is generated by a priori commitment to truth, not the other way around [Horwich] |
9341 | Meanings and concepts cannot give a priori knowledge, because they may be unacceptable [Horwich] |
9334 | If we stipulate the meaning of 'number' to make Hume's Principle true, we first need Hume's Principle [Horwich] |
9339 | A priori knowledge (e.g. classical logic) may derive from the innate structure of our minds [Horwich] |
6387 | A minimum requirement for a theory of meaning is that it include an account of truth [Davidson] |
6391 | A theory of truth tells us how communication by language is possible [Davidson] |
6388 | Is reference the key place where language and the world meet? [Davidson] |
6390 | With a holistic approach, we can give up reference in empirical theories of language [Davidson] |
6389 | To explain the reference of a name, you must explain its sentence-role, so reference can't be defined nonlinguistically [Davidson] |