85 ideas
2512 | Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language [Wittgenstein] |
4148 | What is your aim in philosophy? - To show the fly the way out of the fly-bottle [Wittgenstein] |
12027 | There must be a plausible epistemological theory alongside any metaphysical theory [Forbes,G] |
22490 | Bring words back from metaphysics to everyday use [Wittgenstein] |
6566 | The problem is to explain the role of contradiction in social life [Wittgenstein] |
9331 | How do we determine which of the sentences containing a term comprise its definition? [Horwich] |
12005 | The symbol 'ι' forms definite descriptions; (ιx)F(x) says 'the x which is such that F(x)' [Forbes,G] |
18743 | Wittgenstein says we want the grammar of problems, not their first-order logical structure [Wittgenstein, by Horsten/Pettigrew] |
12010 | Is the meaning of 'and' given by its truth table, or by its introduction and elimination rules? [Forbes,G] |
4139 | Naming is a preparation for description [Wittgenstein] |
4946 | A name is not determined by a description, but by a cluster or family [Wittgenstein, by Kripke] |
12023 | Vagueness problems arise from applying sharp semantics to vague languages [Forbes,G] |
12017 | In all instances of identity, there must be some facts to ensure the identity [Forbes,G] |
12024 | If we combined two clocks, it seems that two clocks may have become one clock. [Forbes,G] |
11885 | Only individual essences will ground identities across worlds in other properties [Forbes,G, by Mackie,P] |
12014 | An individual essence is a set of essential properties which only that object can have [Forbes,G] |
12015 | Non-trivial individual essence is properties other than de dicto, or universal, or relational [Forbes,G] |
15106 | Essence is expressed by grammar [Wittgenstein] |
12013 | Essential properties depend on a category, and perhaps also on particular facts [Forbes,G] |
12012 | Essential properties are those without which an object could not exist [Forbes,G] |
12025 | Artefacts have fuzzy essences [Forbes,G] |
12022 | Same parts does not ensure same artefact, if those parts could constitute a different artefact [Forbes,G] |
12020 | An individual might change their sex in a world, but couldn't have differed in sex at origin [Forbes,G] |
11888 | Identities must hold because of other facts, which must be instrinsic [Forbes,G, by Mackie,P] |
12003 | De re modal formulae, unlike de dicto, are sensitive to transworld identities [Forbes,G] |
12028 | De re necessity is a form of conceptual necessity, just as de dicto necessity is [Forbes,G] |
12008 | Unlike places and times, we cannot separate possible worlds from what is true at them [Forbes,G] |
12009 | The problem with possible worlds realism is epistemological; we can't know properties of possible objects [Forbes,G] |
12007 | Possible worlds are points of logical space, rather like other times than our own [Forbes,G] |
12011 | Transworld identity concerns the limits of possibility for ordinary things [Forbes,G] |
12016 | The problem of transworld identity can be solved by individual essences [Forbes,G] |
12004 | Counterpart theory is not good at handling the logic of identity [Forbes,G] |
12021 | Haecceitism attributes to each individual a primitive identity or thisness [Forbes,G] |
12029 | We believe in thisnesses, because we reject bizarre possibilities as not being about that individual [Forbes,G] |
6600 | The belief that fire burns is like the fear that it burns [Wittgenstein] |
4153 | Are sense-data the material of which the universe is made? [Wittgenstein] |
9333 | A priori belief is not necessarily a priori justification, or a priori knowledge [Horwich] |
9342 | Understanding needs a priori commitment [Horwich] |
9332 | Meaning is generated by a priori commitment to truth, not the other way around [Horwich] |
9341 | Meanings and concepts cannot give a priori knowledge, because they may be unacceptable [Horwich] |
9334 | If we stipulate the meaning of 'number' to make Hume's Principle true, we first need Hume's Principle [Horwich] |
9339 | A priori knowledge (e.g. classical logic) may derive from the innate structure of our minds [Horwich] |
6501 | As sense-data are necessarily private, they are attacked by Wittgenstein's objections [Wittgenstein, by Robinson,H] |
11079 | How do I decide when to accept or obey an intuition? [Wittgenstein] |
4160 | One can mistrust one's own senses, but not one's own beliefs [Wittgenstein] |
19273 | I don't have the opinion that people have minds; I just treat them as such [Wittgenstein] |
5663 | It is irresponsible to generalise from my own case of pain to other people's [Wittgenstein] |
19272 | To imagine another's pain by my own, I must imagine a pain I don't feel, by one I do feel [Wittgenstein] |
4161 | If a lion could talk, we could not understand him [Wittgenstein] |
7392 | If a lion could talk, it would be nothing like other lions [Dennett on Wittgenstein] |
5676 | To say that I 'know' I am in pain means nothing more than that I AM in pain [Wittgenstein] |
4154 | Why are we not aware of the huge gap between mind and brain in ordinary life? [Wittgenstein] |
6165 | Every course of action can either accord or conflict with a rule, so there is no accord or conflict [Wittgenstein] |
4143 | One cannot obey a rule 'privately', because that is a practice, not the same as thinking one is obeying [Wittgenstein] |
7092 | If individuals can't tell if they are following a rule, how does a community do it? [Grayling on Wittgenstein] |
4158 | An 'inner process' stands in need of outward criteria [Wittgenstein] |
4138 | Is white simple, or does it consist of the colours of the rainbow? [Wittgenstein] |
7055 | Externalist accounts of mental content begin in Wittgenstein [Wittgenstein, by Heil] |
12576 | Possessing a concept is knowing how to go on [Wittgenstein, by Peacocke] |
4157 | Concepts direct our interests and investigations, and express those interests [Wittgenstein] |
12606 | Man learns the concept of the past by remembering [Wittgenstein] |
4141 | Various games have a 'family resemblance', as their similarities overlap and criss-cross [Wittgenstein] |
23450 | Wittgenstein rejected his earlier view that the form of language is the form of the world [Wittgenstein, by Morris,M] |
4150 | Asking about verification is only one way of asking about the meaning of a proposition [Wittgenstein] |
4137 | In the majority of cases the meaning of a word is its use in the language [Wittgenstein] |
6567 | For Wittgenstein, words are defined by their use, just as chess pieces are [Wittgenstein, by Fogelin] |
6169 | We do not achieve meaning and understanding in our heads, but in the world [Wittgenstein, by Rowlands] |
4155 | We all seem able to see quite clearly how sentences represent things when we use them [Wittgenstein] |
4142 | To understand a sentence means to understand a language [Wittgenstein] |
4149 | We don't have 'meanings' in our minds in addition to verbal expressions [Wittgenstein] |
4156 | Make the following experiment: say "It's cold here" and mean "It's warm here" [Wittgenstein] |
4145 | How do words refer to sensations? [Wittgenstein] |
4140 | The standard metre in Paris is neither one metre long nor not one metre long [Wittgenstein] |
4136 | To imagine a language means to imagine a form of life [Wittgenstein] |
6166 | Was Wittgenstein's problem between individual and community, or between occasions for an individual? [Rowlands on Wittgenstein] |
7875 | If a brilliant child invented a name for a private sensation, it couldn't communicate it [Wittgenstein] |
4146 | We cannot doublecheck mental images for correctness (or confirm news with many copies of the paper) [Wittgenstein] |
4147 | If we only named pain by our own case, it would be like naming beetles by looking in a private box [Wittgenstein] |
5659 | If the reference is private, that is incompatible with the sense being public [Wittgenstein, by Scruton] |
4152 | Getting from perceptions to words cannot be a private matter; the rules need an institution of use [Wittgenstein] |
4144 | Common human behaviour enables us to interpret an unknown language [Wittgenstein] |
11049 | To communicate, language needs agreement in judgment as well as definition [Wittgenstein] |
6658 | What is left over if I subtract my arm going up from my raising my arm? [Wittgenstein] |
4151 | Grammar tells what kind of object anything is - and theology is a kind of grammar [Wittgenstein] |
4159 | The human body is the best picture of the human soul [Wittgenstein] |