19 ideas
9331 | How do we determine which of the sentences containing a term comprise its definition? [Horwich] |
4483 | If abstract terms are sets of tropes, 'being a unicorn' and 'being a griffin' turn out identical [Loux] |
4477 | Universals come in hierarchies of generality [Loux] |
4481 | Austere nominalists insist that the realist's universals lack the requisite independent identifiability [Loux] |
4482 | Austere nominalism has to take a host of things (like being red, or human) as primitive [Loux] |
4478 | Nominalism needs to account for abstract singular terms like 'circularity'. [Loux] |
4480 | Times and places are identified by objects, so cannot be used in a theory of object-identity [Loux] |
9333 | A priori belief is not necessarily a priori justification, or a priori knowledge [Horwich] |
9342 | Understanding needs a priori commitment [Horwich] |
9332 | Meaning is generated by a priori commitment to truth, not the other way around [Horwich] |
9341 | Meanings and concepts cannot give a priori knowledge, because they may be unacceptable [Horwich] |
9334 | If we stipulate the meaning of 'number' to make Hume's Principle true, we first need Hume's Principle [Horwich] |
9339 | A priori knowledge (e.g. classical logic) may derive from the innate structure of our minds [Horwich] |
17771 | How we evaluate evidence depends on our background beliefs [Bayne] |
17770 | Clifford's dictum seems to block our beliefs in morality, politics and philosophy [Bayne] |
17766 | Physicalism correlates brain and mind, explains causation by thought, and makes nature continuous [Bayne] |
17768 | Perception reveals what animals think, but humans can disengage thought from perception [Bayne] |
17769 | Some people centre space on themselves; others centre space on the earth [Bayne] |
17767 | The alternative to a language of thought is map-like or diagram-like thought [Bayne] |