Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Stipulation, Meaning and Apriority', 'Abstraction Reconsidered' and 'There Are No Abstract Objects'

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15 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 13. Against Definition
How do we determine which of the sentences containing a term comprise its definition? [Horwich]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / c. Against mathematical empiricism
Abstraction from objects won't reveal an operation's being performed 'so many times' [Geach]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / c. Nominalism about abstracta
Call 'nominalism' the denial of numbers, properties, relations and sets [Dorr]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 5. Class Nominalism
Natural Class Nominalism says there are primitive classes of things resembling in one respect [Dorr]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
Abstracta imply non-logical brute necessities, so only nominalists can deny such things [Dorr]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 1. Nature of the A Priori
A priori belief is not necessarily a priori justification, or a priori knowledge [Horwich]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 6. A Priori from Reason
Understanding needs a priori commitment [Horwich]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 8. A Priori as Analytic
Meaning is generated by a priori commitment to truth, not the other way around [Horwich]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 9. A Priori from Concepts
Meanings and concepts cannot give a priori knowledge, because they may be unacceptable [Horwich]
If we stipulate the meaning of 'number' to make Hume's Principle true, we first need Hume's Principle [Horwich]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 10. A Priori as Subjective
A priori knowledge (e.g. classical logic) may derive from the innate structure of our minds [Horwich]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 5. Generalisation by mind
If concepts are just recognitional, then general judgements would be impossible [Geach]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / b. Concepts as abilities
For abstractionists, concepts are capacities to recognise recurrent features of the world [Geach]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 8. Abstractionism Critique
The abstractionist cannot explain 'some' and 'not' [Geach]
Only a judgement can distinguish 'striking' from 'being struck' [Geach]