19 ideas
| 9331 | How do we determine which of the sentences containing a term comprise its definition? [Horwich] |
| 21695 | The set scheme discredited by paradoxes is actually the most natural one [Quine] |
| 21693 | Russell's antinomy challenged the idea that any condition can produce a set [Quine] |
| 21691 | Antinomies contradict accepted ways of reasoning, and demand revisions [Quine] |
| 21690 | Whenever the pursuer reaches the spot where the pursuer has been, the pursued has moved on [Quine] |
| 21689 | A barber shaves only those who do not shave themselves. So does he shave himself? [Quine] |
| 21694 | Membership conditions which involve membership and non-membership are paradoxical [Quine] |
| 21692 | If we write it as '"this sentence is false" is false', there is no paradox [Quine] |
| 10735 | Abstraction from objects won't reveal an operation's being performed 'so many times' [Geach] |
| 9333 | A priori belief is not necessarily a priori justification, or a priori knowledge [Horwich] |
| 9342 | Understanding needs a priori commitment [Horwich] |
| 9332 | Meaning is generated by a priori commitment to truth, not the other way around [Horwich] |
| 9341 | Meanings and concepts cannot give a priori knowledge, because they may be unacceptable [Horwich] |
| 9334 | If we stipulate the meaning of 'number' to make Hume's Principle true, we first need Hume's Principle [Horwich] |
| 9339 | A priori knowledge (e.g. classical logic) may derive from the innate structure of our minds [Horwich] |
| 10732 | If concepts are just recognitional, then general judgements would be impossible [Geach] |
| 10731 | For abstractionists, concepts are capacities to recognise recurrent features of the world [Geach] |
| 10733 | The abstractionist cannot explain 'some' and 'not' [Geach] |
| 10734 | Only a judgement can distinguish 'striking' from 'being struck' [Geach] |