Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Stipulation, Meaning and Apriority', 'Evidentialism' and 'Expositio super viii libros'

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14 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 13. Against Definition
9331 How do we determine which of the sentences containing a term comprise its definition? [Horwich]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
9089 Knowledge is a quality existing subjectively in the soul [William of Ockham]
9091 Sometimes 'knowledge' just concerns the conclusion, sometimes the whole demonstration [William of Ockham]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
8808 Involuntary beliefs can still be evaluated [Feldman/Conee]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty
9090 Knowledge is certain cognition of something that is true [William of Ockham]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 1. Nature of the A Priori
9333 A priori belief is not necessarily a priori justification, or a priori knowledge [Horwich]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 6. A Priori from Reason
9342 Understanding needs a priori commitment [Horwich]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 8. A Priori as Analytic
9332 Meaning is generated by a priori commitment to truth, not the other way around [Horwich]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 9. A Priori from Concepts
9341 Meanings and concepts cannot give a priori knowledge, because they may be unacceptable [Horwich]
9334 If we stipulate the meaning of 'number' to make Hume's Principle true, we first need Hume's Principle [Horwich]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 10. A Priori as Subjective
9339 A priori knowledge (e.g. classical logic) may derive from the innate structure of our minds [Horwich]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 3. Evidentialism / b. Evidentialism
8807 Evidentialism is the view that justification is determined by the quality of the evidence [Feldman/Conee]
8809 Beliefs should fit evidence, and if you ought to believe it, then you are justified [Feldman/Conee]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / a. Reliable knowledge
8810 If someone rejects good criticism through arrogance, that is irrelevant to whether they have knowledge [Feldman/Conee]