Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Stipulation, Meaning and Apriority', 'The Logic of Decision' and 'De arcanus motus'

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11 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 13. Against Definition
9331 How do we determine which of the sentences containing a term comprise its definition? [Horwich]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 1. Powers
12733 Because of the definitions of cause, effect and power, cause and effect have the same power [Leibniz]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
12734 Every necessary proposition is demonstrable to someone who understands [Leibniz]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / b. Worlds as fictions
16285 A possible world can be seen as a complete and consistent novel [Jeffrey]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 1. Nature of the A Priori
9333 A priori belief is not necessarily a priori justification, or a priori knowledge [Horwich]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 6. A Priori from Reason
9342 Understanding needs a priori commitment [Horwich]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 8. A Priori as Analytic
9332 Meaning is generated by a priori commitment to truth, not the other way around [Horwich]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 9. A Priori from Concepts
9341 Meanings and concepts cannot give a priori knowledge, because they may be unacceptable [Horwich]
9334 If we stipulate the meaning of 'number' to make Hume's Principle true, we first need Hume's Principle [Horwich]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 10. A Priori as Subjective
9339 A priori knowledge (e.g. classical logic) may derive from the innate structure of our minds [Horwich]
14. Science / C. Induction / 6. Bayes's Theorem
19155 Instead of gambling, Jeffrey made the objects of Bayesian preference to be propositions [Jeffrey, by Davidson]