Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Stipulation, Meaning and Apriority', 'Leibniz' and 'Philosophical Remarks'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

12 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 13. Against Definition
9331 How do we determine which of the sentences containing a term comprise its definition? [Horwich]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 3. Objects in Thought
22320 An 'object' is just what can be referred to without possible non-existence [Wittgenstein]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
19378 Early modern possibility is what occurs sometime; for Leibniz, it is what is not contradictory [Arthur,R]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 1. Nature of the A Priori
9333 A priori belief is not necessarily a priori justification, or a priori knowledge [Horwich]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 6. A Priori from Reason
9342 Understanding needs a priori commitment [Horwich]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 8. A Priori as Analytic
9332 Meaning is generated by a priori commitment to truth, not the other way around [Horwich]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 9. A Priori from Concepts
9341 Meanings and concepts cannot give a priori knowledge, because they may be unacceptable [Horwich]
9334 If we stipulate the meaning of 'number' to make Hume's Principle true, we first need Hume's Principle [Horwich]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 10. A Priori as Subjective
9339 A priori knowledge (e.g. classical logic) may derive from the innate structure of our minds [Horwich]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 4. Occasionalism
19380 Occasionalism contradicts the Eucharist, which needs genuine changes of substance [Arthur,R]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 2. Meaning as Mental
18283 Language pictures the essence of the world [Wittgenstein]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
18282 You can't believe it if you can't imagine a verification for it [Wittgenstein]