40 ideas
11051 | Frege's logical approach dominates the analytical tradition [Hanna] |
11054 | Scientism says most knowledge comes from the exact sciences [Hanna] |
19048 | Contextual definition shifted the emphasis from words to whole sentences [Quine] |
19047 | Bentham's contextual definitions preserved terms after their denotation became doubtful [Quine] |
9331 | How do we determine which of the sentences containing a term comprise its definition? [Horwich] |
11070 | 'Denying the antecedent' fallacy: φ→ψ, ¬φ, so ¬ψ [Hanna] |
11071 | 'Affirming the consequent' fallacy: φ→ψ, ψ, so φ [Hanna] |
11088 | We can list at least fourteen informal fallacies [Hanna] |
11059 | Circular arguments are formally valid, though informally inadmissible [Hanna] |
11089 | Formally, composition and division fallacies occur in mereology [Hanna] |
11058 | Logic is explanatorily and ontologically dependent on rational animals [Hanna] |
11072 | Logic is personal and variable, but it has a universal core [Hanna] |
11061 | Intensional consequence is based on the content of the concepts [Hanna] |
11063 | Logicism struggles because there is no decent theory of analyticity [Hanna] |
11055 | Supervenience can add covariation, upward dependence, and nomological connection [Hanna] |
11083 | A sentence is necessary if it is true in a set of worlds, and nonfalse in the other worlds [Hanna] |
11086 | Metaphysical necessity can be 'weak' (same as logical) and 'strong' (based on essences) [Hanna] |
11084 | Logical necessity is truth in all logically possible worlds, because of laws and concepts [Hanna] |
11085 | Nomological necessity is truth in all logically possible worlds with our laws [Hanna] |
9333 | A priori belief is not necessarily a priori justification, or a priori knowledge [Horwich] |
9342 | Understanding needs a priori commitment [Horwich] |
9332 | Meaning is generated by a priori commitment to truth, not the other way around [Horwich] |
9341 | Meanings and concepts cannot give a priori knowledge, because they may be unacceptable [Horwich] |
9334 | If we stipulate the meaning of 'number' to make Hume's Principle true, we first need Hume's Principle [Horwich] |
9339 | A priori knowledge (e.g. classical logic) may derive from the innate structure of our minds [Horwich] |
19049 | In scientific theories sentences are too brief to be independent vehicles of empirical meaning [Quine] |
19046 | Empiricism improvements: words for ideas, then sentences, then systems, then no analytic, then naturalism [Quine] |
11077 | Intuition includes apriority, clarity, modality, authority, fallibility and no inferences [Hanna] |
11080 | Intuition is more like memory, imagination or understanding, than like perception [Hanna] |
11078 | Intuition is only outside the 'space of reasons' if all reasons are inferential [Hanna] |
11053 | Explanatory reduction is stronger than ontological reduction [Hanna] |
11081 | Imagination grasps abstracta, generates images, and has its own correctness conditions [Hanna] |
11082 | Should we take the 'depictivist' or the 'descriptivist/propositionalist' view of mental imagery? [Hanna] |
11067 | Rational animals have a normative concept of necessity [Hanna] |
11068 | One tradition says talking is the essence of rationality; the other says the essence is logic [Hanna] |
11047 | Hegelian holistic rationality is the capacity to seek coherence [Hanna] |
11048 | Humean Instrumental rationality is the capacity to seek contingent truths [Hanna] |
11046 | Kantian principled rationality is recognition of a priori universal truths [Hanna] |
11045 | Most psychologists are now cognitivists [Hanna] |
19050 | Holism in language blurs empirical synthetic and empty analytic sentences [Quine] |