18 ideas
| 20728 | Metaphysics is hopeless with its present epistemology; common-sense realism is needed [Colvin] |
| 20726 | We can only distinguish self from non-self if there is an inflexible external reality [Colvin] |
| 20727 | Common-sense realism rests on our interests and practical life [Colvin] |
| 20730 | If objects are doubted because their appearances change, that presupposes one object [Colvin] |
| 20729 | Arguments that objects are unknowable or non-existent assume the knower's existence [Colvin] |
| 20731 | The idea that everything is relations is contradictory; relations are part of the concept of things [Colvin] |
| 2799 | Bayes' theorem explains why very surprising predictions have a higher value as evidence [Horwich] |
| 2798 | Probability of H, given evidence E, is prob(H) x prob(E given H) / prob(E) [Horwich] |
| 2176 | There is only a problem of free will if you think the notion of 'voluntary' can be metaphysically deepened [Williams,B] |
| 2181 | It is an absurd Kantian idea that at the limit rationality and freedom coincide [Williams,B] |
| 4317 | We judge weakness of will by an assessment after the event is concluded [Williams,B, by Cottingham] |
| 2174 | Responsibility involves cause, intention, state of mind, and response after the event [Williams,B] |
| 2178 | In bad actions, guilt points towards victims, and shame to the agent [Williams,B] |
| 2169 | Greek moral progress came when 'virtue' was freed from social status [Williams,B] |
| 2172 | The modern idea of duty is unknown in archaic Greece [Williams,B] |
| 2180 | If reason cannot lead people to good, we must hope they have an internal voice [Williams,B] |
| 2179 | If the moral self is seen as characterless, then other people have a very limited role in our moral lives [Williams,B] |
| 2175 | There is a problem of evil only if you expect the world to be good [Williams,B] |