13 ideas
| 9331 | How do we determine which of the sentences containing a term comprise its definition? [Horwich] |
| 19494 | Fictionalism allows that simulated beliefs may be tracking real facts [Yablo] |
| 19493 | Governing possible worlds theory is the fiction that if something is possible, it happens in a world [Yablo] |
| 19553 | Commitment to 'I have a hand' only makes sense in a context where it has been doubted [Hawthorne] |
| 9333 | A priori belief is not necessarily a priori justification, or a priori knowledge [Horwich] |
| 9342 | Understanding needs a priori commitment [Horwich] |
| 9332 | Meaning is generated by a priori commitment to truth, not the other way around [Horwich] |
| 9341 | Meanings and concepts cannot give a priori knowledge, because they may be unacceptable [Horwich] |
| 9334 | If we stipulate the meaning of 'number' to make Hume's Principle true, we first need Hume's Principle [Horwich] |
| 9339 | A priori knowledge (e.g. classical logic) may derive from the innate structure of our minds [Horwich] |
| 19551 | How can we know the heavyweight implications of normal knowledge? Must we distort 'knowledge'? [Hawthorne] |
| 19552 | We wouldn't know the logical implications of our knowledge if small risks added up to big risks [Hawthorne] |
| 19554 | Denying closure is denying we know P when we know P and Q, which is absurd in simple cases [Hawthorne] |