81 ideas
6891 | Quine's naturalistic and empirical view is based entirely on first-order logic and set theory [Quine, by Mautner] |
6310 | Enquiry needs a conceptual scheme, so we should retain the best available [Quine] |
9331 | How do we determine which of the sentences containing a term comprise its definition? [Horwich] |
13689 | 'Theorems' are formulas provable from no premises at all [Sider] |
13705 | Truth tables assume truth functionality, and are just pictures of truth functions [Sider] |
13710 | In D we add that 'what is necessary is possible'; then tautologies are possible, and contradictions not necessary [Sider] |
13706 | Intuitively, deontic accessibility seems not to be reflexive, but to be serial [Sider] |
13711 | System B introduces iterated modalities [Sider] |
13708 | S5 is the strongest system, since it has the most valid formulas, because it is easy to be S5-valid [Sider] |
13712 | Epistemic accessibility is reflexive, and allows positive and negative introspection (KK and K¬K) [Sider] |
13714 | We can treat modal worlds as different times [Sider] |
13720 | Converse Barcan Formula: □∀αφ→∀α□φ [Sider] |
13718 | The Barcan Formula ∀x□Fx→□∀xFx may be a defect in modal logic [Sider] |
13723 | System B is needed to prove the Barcan Formula [Sider] |
13715 | You can employ intuitionist logic without intuitionism about mathematics [Sider] |
13680 | Maybe logical consequence is a primitive notion [Sider] |
13679 | Maybe logical consequence is more a matter of provability than of truth-preservation [Sider] |
13678 | The most popular account of logical consequence is the semantic or model-theoretic one [Sider] |
13682 | Maybe logical consequence is impossibility of the premises being true and the consequent false [Sider] |
13722 | A 'theorem' is an axiom, or the last line of a legitimate proof [Sider] |
13696 | When a variable is 'free' of the quantifier, the result seems incapable of truth or falsity [Sider] |
13700 | A 'total' function must always produce an output for a given domain [Sider] |
13703 | λ can treat 'is cold and hungry' as a single predicate [Sider] |
12798 | Plurals can in principle be paraphrased away altogether [Quine] |
13687 | No assumptions in axiomatic proofs, so no conditional proof or reductio [Sider] |
13688 | Good axioms should be indisputable logical truths [Sider] |
13691 | Induction has a 'base case', then an 'inductive hypothesis', and then the 'inductive step' [Sider] |
13690 | Proof by induction 'on the length of the formula' deconstructs a formula into its accepted atoms [Sider] |
13685 | Natural deduction helpfully allows reasoning with assumptions [Sider] |
13686 | We can build proofs just from conclusions, rather than from plain formulae [Sider] |
13697 | Valuations in PC assign truth values to formulas relative to variable assignments [Sider] |
13684 | The semantical notion of a logical truth is validity, being true in all interpretations [Sider] |
13704 | It is hard to say which are the logical truths in modal logic, especially for iterated modal operators [Sider] |
13724 | In model theory, first define truth, then validity as truth in all models, and consequence as truth-preservation [Sider] |
13698 | In a complete logic you can avoid axiomatic proofs, by using models to show consequences [Sider] |
13699 | Compactness surprisingly says that no contradictions can emerge when the set goes infinite [Sider] |
17905 | Any progression will do nicely for numbers; they can all then be used to measure multiplicity [Quine] |
13701 | A single second-order sentence validates all of arithmetic - but this can't be proved axiomatically [Sider] |
9556 | Nearly all of mathematics has to quantify over abstract objects [Quine] |
13692 | A 'precisification' of a trivalent interpretation reduces it to a bivalent interpretation [Sider] |
13693 | A 'supervaluation' assigns further Ts and Fs, if they have been assigned in every precisification [Sider] |
13695 | Supervaluational logic is classical, except when it adds the 'Definitely' operator [Sider] |
13694 | We can 'sharpen' vague terms, and then define truth as true-on-all-sharpenings [Sider] |
16462 | The quest for ultimate categories is the quest for a simple clear pattern of notation [Quine] |
13683 | A relation is a feature of multiple objects taken together [Sider] |
15723 | Either dispositions rest on structures, or we keep saying 'all things being equal' [Quine] |
15490 | Explain unmanifested dispositions as structural similarities to objects which have manifested them [Quine, by Martin,CB] |
8504 | Quine aims to deal with properties by the use of eternal open sentences, or classes [Quine, by Devitt] |
7924 | The notion of a physical object is by far the most useful one for science [Quine] |
8464 | Physical objects in space-time are just events or processes, no matter how disconnected [Quine] |
8482 | Mathematicians must be rational but not two-legged, cyclists the opposite. So a mathematical cyclist? [Quine] |
12136 | Cyclist are not actually essentially two-legged [Brody on Quine] |
17594 | We can paraphrase 'x=y' as a sequence of the form 'if Fx then Fy' [Quine] |
13702 | The identity of indiscernibles is necessarily true, if being a member of some set counts as a property [Sider] |
13721 | 'Strong' necessity in all possible worlds; 'weak' necessity in the worlds where the relevant objects exist [Sider] |
13707 | Maybe metaphysical accessibility is intransitive, if a world in which I am a frog is impossible [Sider] |
13709 | Logical truths must be necessary if anything is [Sider] |
13716 | 'If B hadn't shot L someone else would have' if false; 'If B didn't shoot L, someone else did' is true [Sider] |
15725 | Normal conditionals have a truth-value gap when the antecedent is false. [Quine] |
15722 | Conditionals are pointless if the truth value of the antecedent is known [Quine] |
15719 | We feign belief in counterfactual antecedents, and assess how convincing the consequent is [Quine] |
15721 | Counterfactuals are plausible when dispositions are involved, as they imply structures [Quine] |
15724 | Counterfactuals have no place in a strict account of science [Quine] |
15720 | What stays the same in assessing a counterfactual antecedent depends on context [Quine] |
13717 | Transworld identity is not a problem in de dicto sentences, which needn't identify an individual [Sider] |
13719 | Barcan Formula problem: there might have been a ghost, despite nothing existing which could be a ghost [Sider] |
9333 | A priori belief is not necessarily a priori justification, or a priori knowledge [Horwich] |
9342 | Understanding needs a priori commitment [Horwich] |
9332 | Meaning is generated by a priori commitment to truth, not the other way around [Horwich] |
9341 | Meanings and concepts cannot give a priori knowledge, because they may be unacceptable [Horwich] |
9334 | If we stipulate the meaning of 'number' to make Hume's Principle true, we first need Hume's Principle [Horwich] |
9339 | A priori knowledge (e.g. classical logic) may derive from the innate structure of our minds [Horwich] |
4630 | Two theories can be internally consistent and match all the facts, yet be inconsistent with one another [Quine, by Baggini /Fosl] |
3131 | Quine expresses the instrumental version of eliminativism [Quine, by Rey] |
3988 | Indeterminacy of translation also implies indeterminacy in interpreting people's mental states [Dennett on Quine] |
6311 | The firmer the links between sentences and stimuli, the less translations can diverge [Quine] |
6312 | We can never precisely pin down how to translate the native word 'Gavagai' [Quine] |
6313 | Stimulus synonymy of 'Gavagai' and 'Rabbit' does not even guarantee they are coextensive [Quine] |
6317 | Dispositions to speech behaviour, and actual speech, are never enough to fix any one translation [Quine] |
6315 | We should be suspicious of a translation which implies that a people have very strange beliefs [Quine] |
6314 | Weird translations are always possible, but they improve if we impose our own logic on them [Quine] |