Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Stipulation, Meaning and Apriority', 'Essays on Intellectual Powers 1: Preliminary' and 'Improvement of Understanding'

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13 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 2. Aims of Definition
All the intrinsic properties of a thing should be deducible from its definition [Spinoza]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 13. Against Definition
How do we determine which of the sentences containing a term comprise its definition? [Horwich]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 1. Nature of the A Priori
A priori belief is not necessarily a priori justification, or a priori knowledge [Horwich]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 6. A Priori from Reason
Understanding needs a priori commitment [Horwich]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 8. A Priori as Analytic
Meaning is generated by a priori commitment to truth, not the other way around [Horwich]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 9. A Priori from Concepts
Meanings and concepts cannot give a priori knowledge, because they may be unacceptable [Horwich]
If we stipulate the meaning of 'number' to make Hume's Principle true, we first need Hume's Principle [Horwich]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 10. A Priori as Subjective
A priori knowledge (e.g. classical logic) may derive from the innate structure of our minds [Horwich]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 1. Common Sense
Many truths seem obvious, and point to universal agreement - which is what we find [Reid]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
To understand the properties we must know the essence, as with a circle [Spinoza]
18. Thought / C. Content / 2. Ideas
Only philosophers treat ideas as objects [Reid]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 9. Ambiguity
The ambiguity of words impedes the advancement of knowledge [Reid]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
Similar effects come from similar causes, and causes are only what are sufficient for the effects [Reid]