Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Stipulation, Meaning and Apriority', 'Essays on Intellectual Powers 1: Preliminary' and 'Prescriptivism'

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13 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 13. Against Definition
9331 How do we determine which of the sentences containing a term comprise its definition? [Horwich]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 1. Nature of the A Priori
9333 A priori belief is not necessarily a priori justification, or a priori knowledge [Horwich]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 6. A Priori from Reason
9342 Understanding needs a priori commitment [Horwich]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 8. A Priori as Analytic
9332 Meaning is generated by a priori commitment to truth, not the other way around [Horwich]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 9. A Priori from Concepts
9341 Meanings and concepts cannot give a priori knowledge, because they may be unacceptable [Horwich]
9334 If we stipulate the meaning of 'number' to make Hume's Principle true, we first need Hume's Principle [Horwich]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 10. A Priori as Subjective
9339 A priori knowledge (e.g. classical logic) may derive from the innate structure of our minds [Horwich]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 1. Common Sense
23633 Many truths seem obvious, and point to universal agreement - which is what we find [Reid]
18. Thought / C. Content / 2. Ideas
23630 Only philosophers treat ideas as objects [Reid]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 9. Ambiguity
23629 The ambiguity of words impedes the advancement of knowledge [Reid]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / i. Prescriptivism
2854 Prescriptivism says 'ought' without commitment to act is insincere, or weakly used [Hooker,B]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 2. Golden Rule
2856 Universal moral judgements imply the Golden Rule ('do as you would be done by') [Hooker,B]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
23632 Similar effects come from similar causes, and causes are only what are sufficient for the effects [Reid]