15 ideas
9331 | How do we determine which of the sentences containing a term comprise its definition? [Horwich] |
15642 | If kinds depend only on what can be observed, many underlying essences might produce the same kind [Eagle] |
15645 | Nominal essence are the observable properties of things [Eagle] |
15643 | Nominal essence mistakenly gives equal weight to all underlying properties that produce appearances [Eagle] |
16978 | If conceivability is a priori coherence, that implies possibility [Tahko] |
9333 | A priori belief is not necessarily a priori justification, or a priori knowledge [Horwich] |
9342 | Understanding needs a priori commitment [Horwich] |
9332 | Meaning is generated by a priori commitment to truth, not the other way around [Horwich] |
9341 | Meanings and concepts cannot give a priori knowledge, because they may be unacceptable [Horwich] |
9334 | If we stipulate the meaning of 'number' to make Hume's Principle true, we first need Hume's Principle [Horwich] |
9339 | A priori knowledge (e.g. classical logic) may derive from the innate structure of our minds [Horwich] |
16975 | Essences are used to explain natural kinds, modality, and causal powers [Tahko] |
15641 | Kinds are fixed by the essential properties of things - the properties that make it that kind of thing [Eagle] |
16976 | Scientific essentialists tend to characterise essence in terms of modality (not vice versa) [Tahko] |
16977 | If essence is modal and laws are necessary, essentialist knowledge is found by scientists [Tahko] |