16 ideas
| 6405 | Moore's 'The Nature of Judgement' (1898) marked the rejection (with Russell) of idealism [Moore,GE, by Grayling] |
| 7527 | Analysis for Moore and Russell is carving up the world, not investigating language [Moore,GE, by Monk] |
| 19048 | Contextual definition shifted the emphasis from words to whole sentences [Quine] |
| 19047 | Bentham's contextual definitions preserved terms after their denotation became doubtful [Quine] |
| 9331 | How do we determine which of the sentences containing a term comprise its definition? [Horwich] |
| 9333 | A priori belief is not necessarily a priori justification, or a priori knowledge [Horwich] |
| 9342 | Understanding needs a priori commitment [Horwich] |
| 9332 | Meaning is generated by a priori commitment to truth, not the other way around [Horwich] |
| 9341 | Meanings and concepts cannot give a priori knowledge, because they may be unacceptable [Horwich] |
| 9334 | If we stipulate the meaning of 'number' to make Hume's Principle true, we first need Hume's Principle [Horwich] |
| 9339 | A priori knowledge (e.g. classical logic) may derive from the innate structure of our minds [Horwich] |
| 19049 | In scientific theories sentences are too brief to be independent vehicles of empirical meaning [Quine] |
| 19046 | Empiricism improvements: words for ideas, then sentences, then systems, then no analytic, then naturalism [Quine] |
| 22302 | Moor bypassed problems of correspondence by saying true propositions ARE facts [Moore,GE, by Potter] |
| 7526 | Hegelians say propositions defy analysis, but Moore says they can be broken down [Moore,GE, by Monk] |
| 19050 | Holism in language blurs empirical synthetic and empty analytic sentences [Quine] |