18 ideas
| 6859 | Analytic philosophy has much higher standards of thinking than continental philosophy [Williamson] |
| 9331 | How do we determine which of the sentences containing a term comprise its definition? [Horwich] |
| 6862 | Fuzzy logic uses a continuum of truth, but it implies contradictions [Williamson] |
| 10779 | A comprehension axiom is 'predicative' if the formula has no bound second-order variables [Linnebo] |
| 6858 | Formal logic struck me as exactly the language I wanted to think in [Williamson] |
| 10781 | A 'pure logic' must be ontologically innocent, universal, and without presuppositions [Linnebo] |
| 10778 | Can second-order logic be ontologically first-order, with all the benefits of second-order? [Linnebo] |
| 10783 | Plural quantification depends too heavily on combinatorial and set-theoretic considerations [Linnebo] |
| 6863 | Close to conceptual boundaries judgement is too unreliable to give knowledge [Williamson] |
| 10782 | The modern concept of an object is rooted in quantificational logic [Linnebo] |
| 6861 | What sort of logic is needed for vague concepts, and what sort of concept of truth? [Williamson] |
| 9333 | A priori belief is not necessarily a priori justification, or a priori knowledge [Horwich] |
| 9342 | Understanding needs a priori commitment [Horwich] |
| 9332 | Meaning is generated by a priori commitment to truth, not the other way around [Horwich] |
| 9341 | Meanings and concepts cannot give a priori knowledge, because they may be unacceptable [Horwich] |
| 9334 | If we stipulate the meaning of 'number' to make Hume's Principle true, we first need Hume's Principle [Horwich] |
| 9339 | A priori knowledge (e.g. classical logic) may derive from the innate structure of our minds [Horwich] |
| 6860 | How can one discriminate yellow from red, but not the colours in between? [Williamson] |