13 ideas
| 14212 | A consistent theory just needs one model; isomorphic versions will do too, and large domains provide those [Lewis] |
| 8784 | Neo-logicism founds arithmetic on Hume's Principle along with second-order logic [Hale/Wright] |
| 8787 | The Julius Caesar problem asks for a criterion for the concept of a 'number' [Hale/Wright] |
| 8788 | Logicism is only noteworthy if logic has a privileged position in our ontology and epistemology [Hale/Wright] |
| 8783 | Logicism might also be revived with a quantificational approach, or an abstraction-free approach [Hale/Wright] |
| 14213 | Anti-realists see the world as imaginary, or lacking joints, or beyond reference, or beyond truth [Lewis] |
| 14210 | A gerrymandered mereological sum can be a mess, but still have natural joints [Lewis] |
| 7518 | If folk psychology gives a network of causal laws, that fits neatly with functionalism [Churchland,PM] |
| 7520 | Folk psychology never makes any progress, and is marginalised by modern science [Churchland,PM] |
| 7519 | Many mental phenomena are totally unexplained by folk psychology [Churchland,PM] |
| 8786 | One first-order abstraction principle is Frege's definition of 'direction' in terms of parallel lines [Hale/Wright] |
| 14215 | Causal theories of reference make errors in reference easy [Lewis] |
| 14209 | Descriptive theories remain part of the theory of reference (with seven mild modifications) [Lewis] |