14 ideas
15375 | If terms change their designations in different states, they are functions from states to objects [Fitting] |
15376 | Intensional logic adds a second type of quantification, over intensional objects, or individual concepts [Fitting] |
15378 | Awareness logic adds the restriction of an awareness function to epistemic logic [Fitting] |
15379 | Justication logics make explicit the reasons for mathematical truth in proofs [Fitting] |
11026 | Classical logic is deliberately extensional, in order to model mathematics [Fitting] |
11028 | λ-abstraction disambiguates the scope of modal operators [Fitting] |
13365 | Russell's Paradox is a stripped-down version of Cantor's Paradox [Priest,G on Russell] |
10711 | Russell's paradox means we cannot assume that every property is collectivizing [Potter on Russell] |
9127 | Russell refuted Frege's principle that there is a set for each property [Russell, by Sorensen] |
15377 | Definite descriptions pick out different objects in different possible worlds [Fitting] |
7518 | If folk psychology gives a network of causal laws, that fits neatly with functionalism [Churchland,PM] |
7520 | Folk psychology never makes any progress, and is marginalised by modern science [Churchland,PM] |
7519 | Many mental phenomena are totally unexplained by folk psychology [Churchland,PM] |
7531 | We don't assert private thoughts; the objects are part of what we assert [Russell] |